Материал: Karl Marx_ A Biography ( PDFDrive )

of the individual factions of the Continental party of Order now indulge and mutually compromise themselves, far from providing the occasion for new revolutions are, on the contrary, possible only because the basis of the relationships is momentarily so secure and, what the reaction does not know, so bourgeois. From it all attempts of the reaction to hold up bourgeois development will rebound just as certainly as all moral indignation and all enthusiastic proclamations of the democrats. A new revolution is possible only in consequence of a new crisis. It is, however, just as certain as this crisis.5'

At the end of 1851, Louis Napoleon seized power in France as Emperor, thus consolidating the reaction that had followed the 1848 revolution. Marx immediately composed a series of articles which were published by his friend Weydemeyer, in a short-lived New York journal, under the title The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. They constitute his most brilliant political pamphlet. The title is an allusion to the date of the first Napoleon's coup d'etat in 1799 and Marx was concerned to examine the socio-political background of Louis Napoleon's repeat performance in December 1851. In a preface to a second edition of his essay, Marx contrasted his own approach to that of two other well-known pamphleteers on the same subject, Victor Hugo and Proudhon: Hugo confined himself to bitter and witty invective; whereas Proudhon, seeking to represent the coup d'etat as the result of antecedent historical development, ended up with a historical apologia for its hero. 'I, on the contrary,' wrote Marx, 'demonstrate how the class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part.'54

Marx began his demonstration by referring to the remark of Hegel that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occurred twice and added that the first time was tragedy and the second, farce. So it was with the two Bonapartes. He continued:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances direcdy encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.55

Marx applied these considerations to the 1848 revolution and drew a

distinction between eighteenth-century bourgeois revolutions whose very speed and brilliance made them short-lived, and nineteenth-century proletarian revolutions which possessed a slow thoroughness born of constant interruption and self-criticism. Turning to the recent coup d'etat, Marx found unacceptable the excuse that the nation was taken unawares: 'A nation and a woman are not forgiven the unguarded hour in which the first adventurer that came along could violate them. The riddle is not solved by such turns of speech, but merely formulated differently. It remains to be explained how a nation of thirty-six millions can be surprised and delivered unresisting into captivity by three swindlers.'56

Marx then summarised the period dealt with in his Class Struggles. The success of Bonaparte was due to his having organised the Lumpenproletariat of Paris under the cover of a 'benevolent society', with himself at their head. However, this immediate force had to be set against the long-term factors in Bonaparte's favour. The first of these was the old finance aristocracy who 'celebrated every victory of the President over its ostensible representatives as a victory of order'. And the reason for this was evident: 'If in every epoch the stability of the state power signified Moses and the prophets to the entire money-market and to the priests of this money-market, why not all the more so today, when every deluge threatens to sweep away the old states, and the old state debts with them?'57

The industrial bourgeoisie, too, saw in Louis Napoleon the man who could put an end to recent disorders. For this class, 'the struggle to maintain its public interests, its own class interests, its political power, only troubled and upset it, as it was a disturbance of private business'.58 When trade was good, the commercial bourgeoisie raged against political squabbles for fear that trade might be upset; when trade was bad, they blamed it on the instability of the political situation. In 1851 France had indeed passed through a minor trade crisis and this, coupled with constant political ferment, had led the commercial bourgeoisie to cry 'Rather an end to terror than terror without end'59 - a cry well understood by Bonaparte.

Marx devoted the last part of his article to a closer examination of the class basis of Bonaparte's power. To Marx this seemed to be non-existent: 'The struggle seems to be settled in such a way that all classes, equally impotent and equally remote, fall on their knees before the rifle-butt.'60 The explanation was that, having perfected parliamentary power only to withdraw it, the revolution had now to perfect the executive power in order then to destroy it. Marx outlined the history of this bureaucracy:

This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military

organisation, with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores, sprang up in the days of the absolute monarchy, with the decay of the feudal system, which it helped to hasten.6'

During and after the revolution of 1789 the bureaucracy had prepared the class rule of the bourgeoisie; under Louis Philippe and the parliamentary republic it had still been the instrument of the ruling class; under the second Bonaparte 'the state seems to have made itself completely independent'.62 Marx then immediately qualified this by saying: 'and yet the state power is not suspended in mid-air. Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of French society at that, the small-holding peasants.'63 The identity of interest of these peasants did not create a community, since they were physically so scattered. Thus they could not represent themselves, but had to be represented. But the peasants on whom Napoleon relied were burdened by a mortgage debt whose interest was equal to the annual interest on the entire British national debt. Finally the army had degenerated from the flower of the peasant youth into 'the swamp flower of the peasant Lumpenproletariat'.64 Thus, according to Marx, the three key ideas of Napoleon I - independent small-holdings for peasants, taxes to support strong central administration and a large army drawn from the peasants - had found their ultimate degeneration under Louis Napoleon. However, centralisation had been acquired and that would be an important feature of the future society:

The demolition of the state machine will not endanger centralisation. Bureaucracy is only the low and brutal form of a centralisation that is still afflicted with its opposite, with feudalism. When he is disappointed in the Napoleonic Restoration, the French peasant will part with his belief in his small-holding, the entire state edifice erected on this smallholding will fall to the ground and the proletarian revolution will obtain that chorus without which its solo song becomes a swan-song in all peasant countries.65

It is interesting to note that this passage, with its emphasis on centralisation as a progressive factor, was omitted in the second edition of the

Eighteenth Brumaire in 1869.

The conclusion that a new revolution was possible only as a result of a new crisis marked the end of Marx's first period of political activism and his return to the economic studies that had been interrupted by the events of the late 1840s. Inevitably the implications of Marx's views were quite unacceptable to many members of the Communist League. In London the chief spokesman for this opposition was Willich.

The differences between Marx and Willich were not only doctrinal. Willich came from an old and distinguished family. It was even said (and Willich did nothing to dispel the rumour) that he was descended from the Hohenzollerns. Since the age of twelve he had made his career that of a professional soldier, and he was a good one. Engels, his adjutant in the 1849 uprising in Baden, described him as 'brave, coldblooded, skilful and of quick and sound perception in battle, but, when not fighting, something of a boring ideologist'.66 Willich seems to have made an unfortunate impression on the Marx household on his arrival in London by bursting in on them very early in the morning with colourful attire and excessive bonhomie. Jenny even thought that Willich was out to seduce her: 'He would come to visit me', she wrote later, 'because he wanted to pursue the worm that lives in every marriage and lure it out.'67 At any rate it was natural that Marx should be jealous of Willich's flamboyant posturing just as Willich was outraged both by Marx's waning enthusiasm for immediate revolutionary struggle and by his autocratic tendency (according to Willich) to divide mankind into two parties: Marx and the rest. There was also an increasingly unfavourable contrast made by Willich's friends between 'intellectuals' such as Marx, who lived with his family, studied in the British Museum and lectured on economic theory, and 'practical' men like Willich, who lived a bachelor among the refugee workers, shared their hardships and thought that all problems were 'really so simple'.68 Marx might command the distant respect of the workers, but it was Willich who won their devotion.

These differences soon caused dissension in the Central Committee of the Communist League, of which Willich had become a member on the suggestion of Marx himself. In the spring of 1850 Willich quarrelled violently with Engels and refused attempts by the Central Committee to mediate between them. In August Marx opposed Willich's suggestion to the Central Committee that they form a united front with other democratic refugee organisations. The same divergence of opinion occurred in the committee for refugees; here, when Willich found himself in a minority of one, he resigned and took the dispute to a general meeting of the Association where he gained the support of the majority. Marx found himself outflanked on the Left and called a 'reactionary' for his defence of the tactics advocated in the Communist Manifesto. Thus fortified, Willich returned to the attack in the Central Committee on 1 September and passions were so roused that Willich challenged Marx to a duel. Marx had moved a long way since his student days in Bonn and disdained the suggestion, but Conrad Schramm, whom Marx described as the Percy Hotspur of his group, challenged Willich in turn, despite Marx's dissuasions. Duelling was outlawed in England, so they took the night

boat to Ostend, Willich being accompanied by Barthelemy. Liebknecht has left an account of what followed:

In the evening of the following day the door of Marx's house was opened - he was not at home, only Mrs Marx and Lenchen - and Barthelemy entered bowing stiffly and replying with a sepulchral voice to the anxious question 'What news?' 'Schramm a une balle dans la tete!' - Schramm has a bullet in his head - whereupon bowing stiffly once more he turned and withdrew. You may imagine the fright of the half insensible lady; she knew now that her instinctive dislike had not deceived her.

One hour later she related the sad news to us. Of course, we gave up Schramm for lost. The next day, while we were just talking about him sadly, the door was opened and in came with a bandaged head but gaily laughing the sadly mourned one and related that he had received a glancing shot which had stunned him - when he recovered consciousness, he was alone on the sea coast with his second and his physician. Willich and Barthelemy had returned from Ostend on the steamer which they had just been able to reach. With the next boat Schramm followed.69

A split was unavoidable, particularly as Willich had, on his own authority, summoned a general meeting of the London members of the League. Marx therefore resigned from the refugee committee and opened the final meeting of the Central Committee, held on 15 September, with a long speech from the Chair containing three proposals. Firstly, he suggested that the Central Committee be transferred to Cologne; he had opposed the suggestion made previously by Schapper that Cologne be made responsible for Germany, but now the division in London was so great that effective leadership could no longer be given from Britain. Secondly, the new Central Committee should make new statutes since the original statutes of 1847 and the weakened ones of 1848 were neither up to date nor respected by large sections of the League. Thirdly, there should be two completely separate groups in London, both linked directly to the Central Committee in Cologne. This was necessary to preserve the unity of the League, for the views recently expressed by the minority showed that there were important differences of principle between the two groups. Marx continued:

A German national approach pandering to the nationalism of the German manual workers has replaced the universal approach of the Manifesto. Will is put forward as the chief factor in revolution, instead of real relationships. We say to the workers: 'You have 15, 20, 50 years of civil war to go through to change the circumstances and fit yourselves for power!' You say instead: 'We must gain power immediately