Материал: Myth A Very Short Introduction by Robert A. Segal

Frye surely goes too far in characterizing Frazer and Jung as at heart mythographers rather than theorists. Both Frazer and Jung intend to be accounting for the origin and the function, not merely the meaning, of myth, and the ‘grammars’ they provide are intended as proofs, not as compendia of symbols. Frazer claims that ritualistic regicide really did occur, even if it later got watered down to mere drama. Jung claims that archetypes really exist in the mind and even in the world.

Because Frye brings myth and literature so closely together, even without collapsing literature into myth, his literary criticism is confusingly called ‘myth criticism’, of which he himself is often considered the grandest practitioner. Equally commonly, his literary criticism is called ‘archetypal criticism’ because in innocently calling the genres of literature ‘archetypes’, he is mistaken for a Jungian and, again, the grandest of practitioners. To compound the confusion, there are outright Jungian literary critics who are aptly called archetypal critics, beginning with Maud Bodkin in Archetypal Patterns in Poetry. To compound the confusion yet further, there are post-Jungians who call themselves ‘archetypal psychologists’ rather than Jungians. The most prominent are James Hillman and David Miller, both of whom write voluminously on myth.

In Violence and the Sacred and other works René Girard, whose theory was discussed in the previous chapter, offers the sharpest break between myth and literature. Like Fergusson and Frye, Girard faults Harrison and Murray for conflating myth and ritual with tragedy. But he faults the two even more sternly for domesticating tragedy. For Harrison and Murray, myth merely describes the Frazerian ritual, and tragedy merely dramatizes it. Worse, tragedy turns an actual event into a mere theme. For Girard, myth covers up the ritual, and tragedy, as in Sophocles’ plays about Oedipus, uncovers it. Girard’s criticism, however, is directed at Frazer’s second myth-ritualist scenario, in which the king is outright killed. Harrison and Murray use instead Frazer’s first myth-ritualist scenario, in which the king merely plays the part of

literature and Myth

Myth

Myth as story

Another aspect of myth as literature has been the focus on a common story line. Nowhere in Tylor or Frazer is there any consideration of myth as story. (I will use ‘story’ rather than ‘narrative’, the fancier term preferred today.) It is not that either Tylor or Frazer would deny that a myth is a story. It is, rather, that both deem myth a causal explanation of events that merely happens to take the form of a story. The parallel of myth to science requires the downplaying of the story form and the playing up of the explanatory content. Of course, myth for both tells the ‘story’ of how Helios becomes responsible for the sun and how he exercises that responsibility, but what interests Tylor and Frazer is the information itself, not the way it is conveyed. Standard literary considerations, such as characterization, time, voice, point of view, and reader response, are ignored, just as they would be in the analysis of a scientific law.

Because myth for Tylor and Frazer is intended to explain recurrent events, it could be rephrased as a law. For example: Whenever rain falls, it falls because the god of rain has decided to send it, and always for the same reason. When the sun rises, it rises because the sun god has chosen to mount his chariot, to which the sun is attached, and to drive the chariot across the sky, and again always for the same reason. Insofar as Frazer takes the gods to be symbols of natural processes, myth rephrased would be merely descriptive and not explanatory: it would simply be saying that rain falls (regularly or not) or that the sun rises (regularly) but not why.

For Tylor in particular, who reads myth literally, myth is anything but literature, and to approach myth as literature is to trivialize it, to

turn its explanatory truth claims into elaborate poetic descriptions. Where Frye and others argue that literature is not reducible to myth, Tylor argues that myth is not reducible to literature. In the wake of postmodernism, in which arguments in all fields, including science and law, are re-characterized as stories, Tylor’s indifference to the story aspect of myth is notable.

Tylor’s separation of myth from story is no less notable when seen from the standpoint of the American literacy critic Kenneth Burke (1897–1993). In, above all, The Rhetoric of Religion Burke argues that myth is the transformation of metaphysics into story. Myth expresses symbolically, in terms of temporal priority, what primitives cannot express literally: metaphysical priority. In Burke’s famous phrase, myth is the ‘temporizing of essence’. For example, the first creation story in Genesis puts in the form of six days what in fact is the ‘classification’ of things in the world into six categories:

Thus, instead of saying ‘And that completes the first broad division, or classification, of our subject matter,’ we’d say: ‘And the evening and the morning were the first day’.

(Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion, p. 202)

While myth for Burke is ultimately the expression of nontemporal truths, it is still the expression of them in story form, so that even if the meaning needs to be extricated from the form, story is still what makes myth myth. Here Burke is like Lévi-Strauss, whose approach to myth as story will be considered in Chapter 7. What Burke calls ‘essence’, Lévi-Strauss calls ‘structure’.

literature and Myth

Myth

The treatment of similar myths from different regions, by arranging them in large compared groups, makes it possible to trace in mythology the operation of imaginative processes recurring with the evident regularity of mental law . . .

(Tylor, Primitive Culture, I, p. 282)

Where Frye attributes myth to untethered imagination, Tylor attributes it to imagination subject to rigid cognitive constraints – a foreshadowing of present-day cognitive psychology.

In 1876 the Austrian scholar Johann Georg von Hahn used fourteen cases to argue that all ‘Aryan’ hero tales follow an ‘exposure and return’ formula more comprehensive than Tylor’s. In each case the hero is born illegitimately, out of the fear of the prophecy of his future greatness is abandoned by his father, is saved by animals and raised by a lowly couple, fights wars, returns home triumphant, defeats his persecutors, frees his mother, becomes king, founds a city, and dies young. Though himself a solar mythologist, von Hahn, like Tylor, tried only to establish a pattern for hero myths. Had he proceeded to theorize about the tales, his theory would have rested on the commonality of the plot.

Similarly, in 1928 the Russian folklorist Vladimir Propp sought to demonstrate that Russian fairy tales follow a common plot, in which the hero goes off on a successful adventure and upon his return marries and gains the throne. Propp’s pattern skirts both the birth and the death of the hero. While himself a Marxist, Propp here, in his earlier, formalist phase, attempted no more than Tylor and von Hahn: to establish a pattern for hero stories. But again, any theoretical salvo would have depended on the commonality of the plot.

Of the scholars who have theorized about the patterns that they have delineated in hero myths, the most important have been the Viennese psychoanalyst Otto Rank (1884–1939), the American mythographer Joseph Campbell (1904–87), and the English folklorist Lord Raglan (1885–1964). Rank

later broke irreparably with Sigmund Freud, but when he wrote

The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, he was a Freudian apostle. While Campbell was never a fully fledged Jungian, he wrote The Hero with a Thousand Faces as a kindred soul of C. G. Jung. Raglan wrote The Hero as a Frazerian. Rank’s and Campbell’s works will be considered in detail in the next chapter, on myth and psychology. Let us here take Raglan as an illustration of the centrality of plot.

literature and Myth