Материал: Том 2 № 3

Цифровоеправо.Том2, №3, 2021, с.71–77

В.С.Осипов,А.В.Минбалеев/Технологическиеукладыиправоваямысль:дуалистическая

Academician T. Y. Khabrieva (2010) notes that “economic theory and jurisprudence as social sciences are linked by the unity of their universal and general scientific methods”. This position opens upwideopportunitiesforRussianresearcherstodiscussthemutualinfluenceofeconomicandlegal scienceforthebenefitofsolvingtheproblemsofstateandsocialdevelopment.

Research by D. A. Pashentsev, M. V. Zaloilo, and A. A. Dorskaya focuses on the trend of the deve­ lopment of international social science. It explores relationships, mutual influence, and conceptualcategorical interchange, defining new areas and directions of the search and generation of know­ ledge, which can be observed by taking the example of a relatively new and widespread scientific trend—theeconomicanalysisoflaw,aimedatconsideringlegalinstitutionsfromthestandpointof economicconditionality,criticallyrethinkingtraditionallegalresearchmethodology.

However, the authors are not inclined to exclusively follow the mainstream of economic science, which is typical for some researchers (R. A. Posner, R. C. Ellikson, N. Mercuro, S. G. Medema, D. D. Friedman, H. Winter, J. Leitzel, or M. I. Odintsova), but rather continue to adhere to a balanced approach, reflected in the works of other researchers (D. C. North, G. Calabresi, A. G. Karapetov, S.V.Korolev,orI.L.Chestnov).

In this regard, the approach of the monograph’s authors is expressed by taking into account the evolutionary-institutional direction of economic science and irrational motives of the behavior of economic actors in accordance with the latest trends in the development of behavioral theory

(R.Thaler,D.Kahneman,A.Tversky,R.J.Shiller,G.A.Akerlof,etc.).

The problem of legal support for the change of technological orders, the transition to a new way in modern conditions of digitalization of the economy, and the robotization of production, along with a reduction in the use of living labor in the reproduction process, requires appropriate legal support, since the collision of interests of labor and capital against the background of a “legal vacuum” is fraughtwithsocialupheavals,theexperienceanddisastrousconsequencesofwhicharewellknown notonlytoRussia.

Thus, the definition of the legal content and legal regulation of technological structures in their historical and evolutionary dynamics seems to be an urgent research task in the development of fundamentalscience.

The successful combination and application of historical, comparative legal, and formal legal methods not only set a wide context for the study of the development of law in the light of changing technological structures (from the first to the modern sixth), but also ensured the novelty of the results obtained in the form of an increase in scientific knowledge and the identification of true economicandtechnologicalprerequisitesforlegalreformsofthepastandpresent.

Despite the fact that the theory of technological structures is considered the direction of economic research (N. D. Kondratiev, J. A. Schumpeter, D. S. Lvov, S. Y. Glaziev, C. Perez, Y. V. Yakovetz, etc.), the authors thoroughly and reasonably explain the institutional and legal point of the processes of changing technological structures in relation to each order, which should be discussed in more detail.

The first technological order approximately refers to the period of the beginning of the development of technologies, which gave impetus to the development of capitalist relations. This conventionally begins from the second third of the 18th centuryandlastsforaboutacentury.

During this time, outstanding works were created in the fields of politics, jurisprudence, and economics.

Accordingly, in his works Henry St. John Bolingbroke tried to prove that the conflict between the rightofpopularsovereigntyandthedivinerightofthekinghadbeenexhausted,aperiodofstruggle

Digital Law Journal.Vol.2, No.3, 2021,p.71–77

V.S.Osipov,A.V.Minbaleev /TechnologicalOrdersandLegalThought:ADualisticParadigm

for power had begun, and the time had come when the morality of those in power is directly dependentonresponsibility.

David Hume (1998) made a significant contribution to the development of the doctrine of state and law, arguing that the state is created by usurpation or violent conquest without the consent or voluntary subordination of the people. The state, according to Hume, is a collection of rulers and subjects, which ensures the realization of a common interest. Adam Smith (1998) defended the idea that human actions are guided by moral ideas, but in the Wealth of Nations advocated a minimal role forthestateandgreaterfreedomofprivateentrepreneurialinitiative.Duringthesameperiod,other outstandingworkswerecreated:EmerdeVattel,WilliamBlackstone,JeremyBentham,EdmundBurke, William Godwin, François Marie Arouet Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Charles Louis Montesquieu, andmanyothers.

Thesecondtechnologicalmodetookplaceinapproximatelythelasttwothirdsofthe19th century, when steam engines, steam navigation, industrial coal mining, and the development of railways foundwidespreaduse.Inthesocialsciencesandjurisprudenceinparticular,thisperiodischaracter- izedbytheactivedevelopmentofthehistoricalschool(I.Koenig,F.Savigny,G.vonHugo,G.-F.Puchta, S. Muromtsev, P. Novgorodtsev, etc.), which promoted the idea gradual evolutionary reform of legislation and law, taking into account the historical experience of peoples, their customs, and their moralandethicalideas.Thefirstattemptwasmadetoresistthestatistapproachtolaw.

In the same period, R. Pound’s iconic work “Mechanical Jurisprudence” (1908) was published, which assesses the role of logic in the methodology of legal science. It is important to mention here that the so-called pragmatism begins to dominate in philosophy (C. S. Peirce, W. James, J. Dewey), which could not but affect research in the field of legal science and social sciences in general. Pound’s criticism of the rational approach in jurisprudence results in his refusal to re­ cognize science itself as “mechanical” and scientific jurisprudence. The productive development of law, according to Pound, should be based on the philosophy of pragmatism: that is, in practice as a criterion of truth, on meaning, not form, on applied significance, and on the practical implementation of the rule of law.

TheFrenchschooloflegalinstitutionalism,representedbyM.Hauriou,harshlycriticizedthepositionofadherentsoftheregulationoflawanditsidentificationwiththelaw.ThusL.Duguit,F.Moreau, F. Gény, and others unambiguously pointed out that “... there is only one type of law, since there is one type of norm — the law ... and as for the usual norms, it is hardly worth qualifying them, since in fact they no longer exist” (Duguit, 1907; Moreau, 1902; Geny, 1919). Hauriou, however, calls this position fruitless and contrary to “the given history and the facts of modern life” (Hauriou, 1910). In this regard, we state the convergence of the positions of R. Pound and the French institutionalist M. Hauriou. The latter noted that “the invention of the law did not destroy either regulation or custom; the law simply established its supremacy over them” (Hauriou, 1910). The recognition of the rule of law, however, did not abolish the roles of custom or the historical order, which is important preciselyforthepracticeofimplementingnorms.

In this regard, Pound noted that the excessive scientific nature of law is harmful in the impact of the law on society (which surely can be regarded as the embeddedness of legal nihilism). Avoiding mechanisms,pettyregulation,orraisingtheletterabovethespiritcansignificantlyalienatesociety from law due to the complexity of the texts and their weak realizability in practice in the regulation of social relations. Ford’s conveyor system suffered from the same problem: production operations were subject to petty regulation, whilst the monotony of work operations led to workers’ rapid fatigue and a sharp decrease in labor productivity. This disadvantage was subsequently eliminated