Материал: The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion by John Hinnells
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Referring to Hinnells’ work on the Parsis, for example, Cohen maintained that those Zoroastrians who migrated from Persia to India so as to survive the Islamisation of early Muslim Iran, represented ‘not so much a travelling nation then, as a travelling religion … Parsees … do not seek to return to, or to recreate, a homeland’ (1997: 188–9). Hinnells (2005) takes issue with these arguments about both the Parsis and religion per se. First, he notes that orientation to the homeland can be manifest to various degrees of intensity and, for some, cultural identification with the homeland may be far more important than return (cf. Brah 1996). Hinnells insists that many Parsis do still speak of themselves as Persians and not Indians. Not least because of the Islamic Republic in contemporary Iran, few currently consider returning to live there. Nevertheless, the Parsis do express their love for Persia in various ways. For example, they furnish their homes with books, artefacts and symbols of ancient Iran and organise religious tours as and when possible. Second, Hinnells suggests that Cohen’s comments also raise questions about what is meant by the term ‘world religions’. If this simply identifies a tradition to be found in many countries around the world, and so is related to globalisation and international migration, then Zoroastrianism would ‘qualify’, as would most other ‘faiths’ today. However, if, as Cohen implies (1997: 188), a world religion is a Âtradition open to all people in the world, then Hinnells (2005) is clear that not only Zoroastrianism, but also Judaism, Hinduism and Sikhism are not really world religions.
Vertovec (2004) takes up this debate in a somewhat different way. He is less concerned with what constitutes a ‘world religion’ than the distinctions that can be made between different ‘types’ of traditions. For example, Vertovec reminds us that, given the existence of the Zionist and Khalistani movements, Judaism and Sikhism are both exceptions to Cohen’s general rule about religions and homelands. Both ‘religions’ are in effect ‘discrete ethnic groups’ (2004: 281). Indeed, he argues that, if Judaism and Sikhism can be considered exceptions, as Cohen agrees they can, then so, too, can Hinduism. The emphasis here is on ‘a place’ as much as ‘a people’: ‘no matter where in the world they live, most Hindus tend to sacralize India … [as] a spiritual homeland’ (Vertovec 2004: 281).9 As Hinnells (2005) remarks, Cohen’s rule is clearly one with a lot of exceptions. Nevertheless, if, following Knott (1986: 11) and others, we differentiate between so-called ethnic and universal traditions, then Vertovec’s distinctions could make good sense. Ethnic religions may properly represent diasporas. However, for other, more universal and missionary religions, less obviously tied to particular peoples or places, for example Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, the relationship with ethnicity can be very different:
It broadens the term far too much to talk – as many scholars do – about the “Muslim diaspora”, “Catholic diaspora” … and so forth. These are of course world traditions that span many ethnic groups and nationalities … Hinnells (1997) himself flags up one problem … are Muslims in Pakistan part of a diaspora religion because Islam is derived from and broadly centred on Mecca?
(Vertovec 2004: 281)
Perhaps, in the case of universal religions, then, it would be better to speak only of migration or transnationalism. However, Vertovec does not make such a suggestion. Indeed, accounts that explicitly identify ‘transnational religion’, while having more than doubled in the last five years (see, for example, Levitt 2007), are still relatively few in number compared to those concerned with ‘diaspora religion’.10 Moreover, it also seems clear that apparently ethnic and universal traditions can behave like each other in different situations.
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For example, we have seen already how Smart (1987) argues that under the conditions of the global postmodern plural Hindu traditions are exhibiting a tendency to universalise. Similarly, traditions such as Christianity and Islam have always been ethnicised in practice.11 To spread their messages successfully and stay meaningful through time and across space, both have had to be flexible enough to adapt to local circumstances. Indeed, once people are gradually born into universal traditions, religion becomes indigenised and so, for many adherents, essentially a matter of custom and descent. Thus what we are actually seeing at work here – and within the quotation from Vertovec – is the ongoing dialectic of the global and the local, abstracted universal spaces and the unpredictability of everyday life rooted in the particular.
Despite the evident salience of such processes of glocalisation, where religious and cultural identities are both deterritorialised and reterritorialised, in diaspora especially, many secondand third-generation youth are prioritising what they see as the universals of religion from the localised custom they associate with their parents’ and grandparents’ homelands. One way of analysing this situation is to relate it to Mol’s (1979) conception of religion as the ‘sacralizer of identity’ and ‘harnesser of change’. Because religion, backed by the sacred authority of the past, has such great potential for articulating distinctiveness in its own right, this can open the way for other potential markers of ethnic identity to become more negotiable as time passes and those born in the diaspora establish their own priorities and ‘routes’. So long as religious boundaries are maintained – and, recalling Cohen (1985), this does not require unchanging content – language and aspects of custom, as well as attachment to the homeland per se, can become relatively less important and perhaps eventually abandoned altogether. This opens up the possibility for a new, more mobile, religious ‘homing desire’ (Brah 1996: 179–80) without the risk of losing all sense of continuity in a ‘chain of memory’ (cf. Hervieu-Léger 2000). Indeed, the prioritisation of religion over custom, especially for those with most invested in new contexts, can facilitate adaptation and acculturation, while all the time retaining a sense of pride in distinctiveness and rejecting outright assimilation. Ter Haar (1998), for example, shows how many African Christians in Europe are forward, rather than backward, looking. They see themselves as part of an international, rather than an ethnic, church, deliberately using religion as a source of capital to bridge outwards and link upwards beyond the bonding provided by cultural heritage per se.
In a roundabout way then, Cohen’s account of religion does actually begin to strike the right chord. On the one hand, religions can and do provide ‘additional cement’ and ‘cohesion’ to ‘territorial’ ethno-national diasporas (1997: 189; 2008: 153). However, in different contexts, the very same traditions, differently configured and deployed, can challenge and transcend ethnicity (as well as the nation-state – see Baumann 1999) by forging multi-ethnic and more universalising networks and linkages. They can point beyond the territorial to the extraterritorial (1997: 189), whether that be in terms of the convergences of a global ethics and civil society or the conflicts of transnational terrorism (Jurgensmeyer 2002). In our penultimate section I briefly summarise how religious studies’ more empirical agenda, in terms of mapping contemporary patterns and trends, has evolved in the last decade or so.
Mapping religion and diaspora: summary patterns and trends
Perhaps the main characteristic of contemporary scholarship on religion and diaspora has been the growth of empirical studies. In many ways this is more representative of the research that has been completed than the theoretical debates considered in the previous section.
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To give a flavour of this work, and provide an opportunity for further reading, indicative studies of contemporary Sikhs, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, Muslims and others have all been cited in endnotes to this chapter. The majority focus on people resettled in North America and Europe, although the processes described are by no means confined to the West and increasingly reflect cross-border circulations. With just a few exceptions, all were written in the 1990s or 2000s. This reflects the fact that, in the last two decades or so, diasporas established in the post-war period have begun to mature and are increasingly visible in public life (Coward et al. 2000) as well as international politics. Most tend to focus on one religious tradition and/or ethnic community. However, Hinnells (2005)
– in an account of Zoroastrianism in eleven countries – argues that comparative studies should be more of a priority.
Attention to comparative perspectives begins to reveal important differences within and between religious traditions, depending upon such factors as the dynamics of regional and national contexts and the nature of specific groups. Hinnells (1997), for example, elaborates an ambitious international comparison across the major religious traditions of South Asian diasporas in Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States.12 Since the 1960s, when South Asian migration to Canada and the United States began, newcomers there have tended to be educated professionals more likely to integrate and produce innovative religious scholarship (1997: 837, 840). In Britain, by contrast, because of its colonial connections to the subcontinent, diasporas are longer-standing and comprise a higher percentage of unskilled workers, although this is rapidly changing, especially amongst Hindus and Sikhs (1997: 836). Whereas in Britain South Asian heritage Muslims predominate (1997: 841), in the United States and Canada the Muslim presence is more ethnically diverse. Of the Jains, Hinnells remarks that, given their low public profile and numbers in all contexts, for pragmatic reasons they will often tolerate the outsiders’ perception of them as part of the Indian, or Hindu, scene rather than as something different’ (1997: 843).
Clearly, it is extremely difficult in a general survey to do justice to the numerous empirical studies that have been conducted, or even Hinnells’ more comparative synthesis of such material. Nevertheless, by way of drawing different threads together, and so dealing more systematically with the empirical realities only alluded to thus far, I present now a summary of the key factors, patterns and trends that need to be taken into account when beginning to study religion and diaspora. Such a summary might even function as an outline syllabus for a course of study. My starting point was the agenda for the religious mapping of Southall referred to at the beginning of this chapter. However, once I began to write it was, of course, impossible to exclude my subsequent experiences as a researcher and teacher across Islamic, South Asian and religious studies or, indeed, new insights gleaned from reading and rereading the literature while preparing this piece.
1The context of reception or settlement in terms of particular nation-states has very significant consequences in shaping the general dynamics of migration and diaspora. Factors deserving of consideration include: the legacy of colonialism; the extent of citizenship rights; the nature of immigration/security legislation; social attitudes to cultural pluralism and levels of protection from discrimination; the status and public recognition of religion; employment and educational opportunities; the numbers of coethnics and co-religionists settled in a particular area, and the relative size and presence of other religious and ethnic groups. For example, existing religion-state relations can determine the extent to which the public sphere is hospitable to other faiths.
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2The different resources that migrants can mobilise – their social or cultural ‘capital’ – are also important in moulding experiences in diaspora. Initially, these will largely be constrained by the social, economic and political structures of the context of migration, and as well as its timing and circumstances, and the nature and extent of continuing links to the homeland. Otherwise, this might include: levels of cohesion in the diaspora, including the shape and levels of organisational infrastructure, and the authority of leaderships and their ability to make alliances that bridge outwards and link upwards. For example, ‘twice migrants’, i.e. those who already have experience of migration, education and business in other parts of the diaspora, are very likely to succeed more quickly than unskilled, first time migrants, from rural areas.
3Huge moral and economic investments are made by diasporic communities to establish and sustain more or less autonomous, associations including multi-functional religious institutions. Such investments were often accelerated as the need to transmit homeland traditions beyond the family was brought sharply into focus by the emergence of generations socialised, educated and/or born in the diaspora. The idea of a congregation can thus become more significant than in the homeland, as public meetings for worship also provide an opportunity for a range of socialising and organising in what is initially an alien context.
4Facilitating an imagined sense of continuity with the past is an important function of religion and especially religious ritual in diaspora. The re-making of sacred spaces through familiar bodily performances of speech, music, dance, drama and art, are all a way of remembering and transmitting homeland culture as well as binding communities together in new settings. However, compared to what was commonplace in the homeland, ritual practices can also be much elaborated, standardised or reoriented, and even disappear overseas. Some aspects of religious practice travel better than others, while the public celebration of festivals can mark a growing confidence of diasporas to lay claim to their new home.
5All such ‘communities’ are inevitably divided amongst themselves along various lines of cleavage, so much so that ethnic, denominational/sectarian and other divisions can result in open struggles for power over the control of institutions. So, while communal ‘fusion’ and cooperation is a feature of early settlement, ‘fission’ and Âfragmentation is quick to develop as groups mature, especially where the numbers settled locally allow the formation of new and distinct congregations. Notably, in these circumstances, religious ideologies can become a resource to sanctify the marking of social status hierarchies, including some and excluding others, for example, in terms of ethnicity and race.Â
6Depending on the age and gender profiles of diasporas, dominant constituencies such as older men also often marginalise the interests of younger men and women. Despite young people’s protestations about their lack of appropriate skills, elders may still prefer to import functionaries from the homeland to secure a form of transmission which emphasises cultural continuity. Yet, if conservative transmission is seen to be failing – and perhaps even creating a gap that could be filled by political radicals – it can increasingly become a matter for state intervention. The same is true of important gendered sites of struggle. While male leaderships are challenged by the public activities of women, issues such as education, sexuality, work and marriage can remain contentious.
7Less institutionalised or more implicit forms of religiosity remain important in the private, domestic and individualised spaces of diaspora. Amongst women especially, intra-household rituals and rites of passage are a crucial aspect of reproducing the wider
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community as well as the family. Although, they routinely lack the authority of public religious institutions and leaderships, with roots in hybrid homeland cultures, they often retain the potential to subvert orthodoxies, especially in these alternative spaces. Moreover, globalised trends toward the decentring of religious authority via the virtual communities of the new media open up endless possibilities for more fluid and dissenting religious forms.
8While religion can undoubtedly reinforce ethnicity, the children and grandchildren of migrants increasingly produce their own local-global interpretations of traditions, often arguing for the separation of religious ‘universals’ from cultural ‘particulars’ in ways their parents and grandparents rarely did. A globalised tendency towards the modernisation, universalisation and Protestantisation of belief is in evidence here, although so too are processes of compartmentalisation and secularisation. Cosmopolitan encounters with ‘others’ of the same faith tradition in diaspora have broadened awareness and selfconscious explorations of global religious identities at the expense of ethnicity. However, this becomes manifest in new vernacular forms of religion, for example, in terms of dress, organisations and public engagement as well as thinking. Other factors to take into account in this regard include: translations of sacred texts (which allow access to their meaning); pluralism and the liberal project of interfaith relations; rationalised and decontextualised accounts of ‘world religions’ reproduced in school-based religious education.
9As leaderships seek to present a common front to outsiders, especially when seeking recognition from the state in respect of planning permission, animal sacrifice, school uniforms, burial or cremation arrangements, ‘fusion’ reasserts itself contextually and temporarily over ‘fission’, in the shape of local, national and international umbrella organisations. Given the manifest resources often associated with religious institutions in diaspora – buildings, people, voluntary giving, etc. – the local and/or national state may incorporate such organisations into projects seeking to manage minority populations. However, in so doing, communities risk their autonomy and the state runs the risk of endorsing particular versions of religious orthodoxy, while attempts at multiulturalism can reinforce difference as much as promote integration or critical dialogues. For good or ill, religion, at least as much as race or ethnicity, has become one of the main ways of identifying the ‘difference’ of migrants, diasporas and transnationals among both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in contemporary Western societies.
10Transnational flows between diasporas, ethno-national homelands and sacred centres of faith traditions constitute the everyday reality of a globalised network society. Such networks are sustained by pilgrimages and holidays, various media, including satellite television, and the visits of religious and political leaders, as well as international movements and world organisations. Indeed, in the form of the mass media and conumerism, late modern globalisation appears to have become a key means by which religion flourishes. Given its extraterritorial ability to trump the nation-state with nonlocative as well as more evidently locative identifications, religions can also provide powerful resources for imagining alternatives to the moral and political order suggested by the West. Whether because of nostalgia, or a lack of access to power, diasporas have played a significant role in supporting not only homeland movements, but also religious nationalism and even transnational terrorism. Political crises ‘there’ continue to impact communities and identities ‘here’ and vice versa.