Материал: The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion by John Hinnells

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diversity and fragmentation as more fruitful ways of thinking about religion today. Wilson used the contemporary proliferation of new religious movements to argue that religion was becoming an increasingly private, and often less ‘authentic’, affair. Stark and his associates invoked new religious movements to argue for the persistence of religious innovation. Grace Davie has cited them simply as multiple religious constituencies in her broader argument that, while more people may believe rather than belong these days, religion still has an important, if less visible, function as a source of identity in multi-faith Britain (Davie 1994).

Two new interventions

Alongside such work, Charles Taylor and Talal Asad, each using quite different approaches, have recently made new and substantive contributions to the debate over secularization and its conditions. In A Secular Age (2007), a formidable book in both length and scope, Taylor pointed out that the scholars we have examined so far chose to look at secularization either in terms of institutions and practices or the falling away of religious belief and behaviour. As a philosopher and social theorist – not a sociologist by training – he suggested the possibility of a new direction. This was to focus on the changing ‘conditions of belief’ that have underpinned the shift from a pre-modern sense of God as an unchallengeable reality to the current climate in which God is optional. Some key assumptions running through Taylor’s book were, first, that all human beings have a common religious capacity and are engaged in a search for an experience of joy or fullness to give meaning to their lives, however diverse this search might appear in form. Second, as Peter Berger had done a couple of decades earlier, Taylor assumed that human consciousness and social structures and institutions are interrelated. Lastly, his endeavour to trace ‘changing conditions of belief’ was founded on the premise that access is possible to ‘the different kinds of lived experience involved in understanding your life one way or another’ (Taylor 2007: 5). Accordingly, he concluded, accounting for why we live in a secular age is a matter of accounting for ‘the whole context of understanding in which our moral, spiritual or religious experience and search takes place’ (ibid.: 3).

Taylor drew on a number of aspects of Weber’s work in order to make his argument. For instance, in order to solidify the relationship between individual consciousness and society that was at the crux of his thesis, he made extensive use of Weber’s idea of disenchantment by coupling it with his own earlier work on historical ideas of selfhood. He posited that in ‘enchanted’ times and places, in which religion is all encompassing and unquestioned, people experience themselves as having ‘porous’ selves and are therefore open to being influenced by external entities such as spirits and deities. Conversely, as disenchantment increases in any society, selves become increasingly ‘buffered’. People experience firmer boundaries between their selves and other entities, and feel less vulnerable to supernatural invasion. Taylor also agreed with Weber that the Reformation and Protestantism were prime contributors to this disenchantment. But he vigorously criticized what he called ‘subtraction stories’ of linear religious decline, and the assumption that modernity inevitably heralds the ‘death of God’. Instead, he advocated a theory of re-enchantment. While conceding that secularization and secularity both exist today in limited senses, Taylor argued ‘religious longing … remains a strong independent source of motivation in modernity’ (2007: 530), and that new forms of religious searching are in the making.

Taylor’s book won the 2007 Templeton prize – awarded annually for ‘progress toward research or discoveries about spiritual realities’ – and despite its nods to Weber was unabashedly Durkheimian in spirit. This particular scholarly debt was made explicit in the

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classificatory system of different types of religion and society he put together. Taylor associated his first type, called the ‘paleo-Durkheimian’, with pre-modern societies in which ‘the force which inheres in social obligations comes from the sacred of which the Church is guardian and articulator’ (ibid.: 442). He categorized nations in which ‘religious belonging is central to political identity’ (ibid.: 455) under his second type, the ‘neo-Durkheimian’. Lastly, he linked his third type, the ‘post-Durkheimian’, to contemporary pluralistic societies in which each person can conduct their spiritual search according to their personal inclinations, without reference to orthodoxies and hierarchies or an overarching social framework. Furthermore, throughout the book, and like his intellectual predecessor, he spoke optimistically of relationships between the sacred and human beings and of ‘new ways of existing both in and out of relation to God’ (ibid.: 437).

It is instructive to juxtapose the writings of Taylor and Asad, as the longstanding aims of the latter have been to unsettle received wisdom and to undercut the apparent coherence of unitary narratives. His writings have therefore offered a rather different perspective, both to Taylor and to that of the other scholars covered so far. In Formations of the Secular (2003), for example, Asad problematized categories – such as ‘religion’ and ‘the sacred’ – through which Western scholars and others have tried to make sense of the world and our place in it, saying,

I assume … that there is nothing essentially religious, nor any universal essence that defines ‘sacred language’ or ‘sacred experience’.

(Asad 2003: 25; italics in original)

Agreeing with the French sociologist François Isambert, he argued that Durkheim’s school was complicit in the creation of the scholarly narrative of the ‘sacred’ as a homogenous and universal essence (ibid.: 32–3). And he suggested that Weberian disenchantment, rather than being evidence of secularizing processes, ‘… is, arguably, a product of nineteenth century romanticism, partly linked to the growing habit of reading imaginative literature – being enclosed within and by it – so that images of a “pre-modern” past acquire in retrospect a quality of enchantment’(ibid.: 13–4).

Asad has also offered specific critiques of Taylor’s work. Like Peter Berger and Grace Davie, he has sought to move away from the question of whether the classic secularization thesis is correct. But, unlike them, his interest has been in the political dimensions of the secular: ‘If the secularization thesis no longer carries the conviction it once did,’ he has said, ‘it is because the categories of “politics” and “religion” turn out to implicate each other more profoundly than we thought’ (ibid.:200). Influenced by the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault, Asad’s attention has been concentrated on unmasking subtle political efforts to dominate and establish control. For instance, he has criticized Taylor’s attempts to define religion, on the grounds that such definitions are ways of forcing commentary along certain prescribed paths:

What are the stakes in wanting a fixed definition of ‘religion’, whether in terms of ‘a sense of fullness’, as Taylor suggests, or of ‘transcendence’, or of ‘something beyond what has yet been achieved or will ever be achieved’ – and so on?

(Asad 2007)

He has also rejected Taylor’s description of contemporary ‘secularity’ – Taylor’s third religious type – as overly-optimistic. Instead of viewing secular states as spaces within

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which all are free to express themselves, and where plurality is tolerated, Asad’s position is that the nation-state is inherently coercive. Since secularism arises within nation-states, therefore, it ‘is not simply an intellectual answer to a question about enduring social peace and toleration’ (Asad 2003:5), nor the vacuum that is left when religion has vacated the premises, but involves the inequalities and exclusions that are forcibly imposed in any political system.

Some closing thoughts

Many scholars have lately come to agree with the spirit of Thomas Luckmann’s early comment that the secularization thesis is best described as a mythological account of the emergence of the modern world (Luckmann 1967). However, even if one’s intellectual commitments are akin to those of Asad, it is not easy to dispense with the theory. This is because the historical particularity he has championed in opposition to the universalist claims of the Enlightenment only became intelligible through the intellectual developments of the latter. As Casanova has noted, it ‘is so intrinsically interwoven with all the theories of the modern world and with the self-understanding of modernity that one cannot simply discard the theory of secularization without putting into question the entire web, including much of the self-understanding of the social sciences’ (Casanova 1994: 18). In other words, it cannot be rejected without implicitly calling into question a host of other theories and assumptions commonly taken for granted. For instance, the idea that a benign trajectory of Progress, brought about by intellectual accomplishment rather than by articles of faith, will eventually lead to a complete and rational understanding of the laws underpinning nature and society.

Because it is such a pervasive theory, it is also practically impossible to refute empirically, whatever form it takes. For example, Wilson and others have suggested that the inexorable process they envisage might not be entirely linear. It could hypothetically occur at very different rates in different locations, depending on local conditions. At times, it might even seem to be reversed in the short term. So it is possible for a scholar interested in so doing to challenge specific elements of their argument, for instance the unreflective adoption of a Christian idea of religion. But it is difficult to know what evidence could be brought to bear that would convincingly rebut the argument in its entirety. A confirmed believer could always dismiss contrary evidence as a temporary setback, an insignificant exception to the rule, or as evidence of something other than ‘religion’ being at work: ‘superstition’, ‘nationalism’, or ‘ethnic identity’.

It is also the case that, even if one accepts that religion has generally been removed from the public sphere, other scenarios than its decline can equally well explain this trend. For instance, a gender-sensitive account might find that there has been a shift away from public, ‘male-centred’ religion. Individuals have moved towards private religious activity that is more ‘female’ in character, reflecting the increased value attached to ‘the feminine’ in the West. Or, as some have argued, it could be said that public Christianity has retreated because of immigration and competition resulting from increased global communication, rather than through secularization. Such an argument would be that it has been replaced by less traditional religious forms, reflecting the increasingly multicultural and option-ridden world in which we live.

As Karl Popper pointed out, millions of people believe in astrology because it is possible to assemble a wealth of evidence indicating that it ‘really works’ (1989). He reflected that believers believe in astrology, and many other theories, because of the propensity of human

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beings to see confirming instances all around them once they have adopted a particular perspective. But confirming instances cannot be used as proofs, since any particular situation can be interpreted in light of a particular theory. So Popper concluded that only a theory couched in such a way as to be open to indisputable refutation can be properly tested, and be said to be scientific. It is not possible to prove that astrology definitively works, said Popper, since its statements cannot be unequivocally falsified. The same can be said of the secularization thesis. Both appear to have explanatory power, but cannot be subjected to rigorous scrutiny and refutation. Following Popper’s argument, neither astrology nor secularization may be properly considered a scientific theory.

Steve Bruce, in particular, might protest at what I have just said. Indeed, in a 1995 article, Bruce put forward a number of statements in opposition to his own view. These included such hypotheses as: ‘Insofar as it can be measured or gauged, compared with 1800, 1850, 1900, or 1950, there is now greater competition to join the clergy’. He then set about dispatching each one in order to show that secularization was occurring (Bruce 1995). But each of his arguments can be disputed, and in no case is his refutation unequivocal. For example, regarding the question of numbers joining the clergy, Bruce discounted the recent ordination of women in the UK and elsewhere as irrelevant. Instead, he focused on the fact that the younger sons of British gentry, who often chose to join the Church in centuries past, do not become ordained today in the same numbers as before. But it is equally possible to conclude that economic changes have meant that other career options have opened up to such individuals rather than to conclude that this is evidence of secularization. Further, just because the constituencies of the would-be ordained have shifted is not proof of secularization either. Arguably, it is merely evidence of changing class structures and of women’s increasing public participation. In other words, despite his hypotheses and testing, Bruce did not produce conclusive evidence for secularization over some other explanation. Yet those who have championed a more Durkheimian view of secularization, suggesting that religious innovation works in cyclic fashion, have not always been persuasive in making their case either. Their arguments have often rested on highlighting of instances of religion flourishing in contemporary society. On occasion, this has involved overlooking, or explaining away, apparent examples of religion in decline.

However, as in the case of astrology, this does not necessarily mean that any of the theories of secularization that have been considered are wrong. It simply means that they are impossible to test rigorously, should we desire to do so. We can take a persuasive and informed view in relation to secularization. We can even try to think about religion without invoking this term. But we cannot know beyond doubt whether the theory is correct or not, in any of its forms. And, as with astrology, the view that we do adopt is likely to be coloured by our ideological and personal predilections and prejudices. Having said this, while the utility of traditional secularization theory may be under dispute, one thing is certain: if anyone in the future asks for your view on whether secularization is occurring, you should require him or her first to explain exactly what is meant by the question.

Summary

There has been considerable disagreement between scholars on the subject of secularization, due to confusion over the definition of terms and because their arguments have been founded on rather different ideological assumptions. This chapter traces the historical antecedents of the arguments put forward today, and the positions of key contributors to the debate.

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Bibliography

Asad, T. (2003) Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Asad, T. (2007) ‘Secularism, hegemony and fullness’. Posted 11/17/2007 on The Immanent Frame. http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/

Berger, P. (1969) The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Bruce, S. (1995) ‘The Truth About Religion in Britain’ in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34: 417–430.

Bruce, S. (1996) Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruce, S. (2002) God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford: Blackwell.

Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Davie, G. (1994) Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell.

Durkheim, E. (1912) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life trans. Karen Fields 1995. New York: Free Press.

Greeley, A. (1972) Unsecular Man: The Persistence of Religion. New York: Schocken.

Hanson, S. (1997) ‘The Secularization Thesis: Talking at Cross Purposes’ in Journal of Contemporary Religion 12,2: 159–180.

Luckmann, T. (1967) The Invisible Religion. New York: Macmillan.

Martin, D. (1969) The Religious and the Secular. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Popper, K. (1989) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge. 5th edition (revised).

Stark, R. (1985) ‘Europe’s Receptivity to Religious Movements’ in R. Stark ed. Religious Movements: Genesis, Exodus and Numbers. New York: Paragon.

Stark, R. and L. R. Iannaccone (1994) ‘A Supply-side Re-interpretation of the “Secularization” of Europe’ in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33: 230–252.

Swatos, W. H. and Olson, D. V. ed. (2000) The Secularization Debate. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Taylor, C. (2007) A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Weber, M. (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism trans. by Talcot Parsons. London: Allen & Unwin.

Wallis, R. (1986) ‘Figuring Out Cult Receptivity’ in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 25:494– 503.

Wilson, B. (1966) Religion in Secular Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Suggested reading

Asad, T. (2003) Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

An examination of the genealogies of the ‘secular’ and the political dimensions of secularism.

Asad, T. (2007) ‘Secularism, hegemony and fullness’. Posted 11/17/2007 on The Immanent Frame http:// www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/

The SSRC blog, The Immanent Frame, has hosted a vigorous debate on Taylor’s work, including comments from Bellah, Asad, and a number of other distinguished contributors.