Материал: The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion by John Hinnells

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believer and infidel was fused with the dichotomies of oppressed and oppressor and colonized and colonizer.

Resentment of the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia and what bin Laden viewed as the subjugation of Saudi Arabia pervaded his early statements (see Munson 2004). Indeed, bin Laden has condemned the Saudi regime as heretical because of its subordination to the United States. This is significant. Saudi Arabia is viewed by most outsiders, including many Muslims, as a thoroughly fundamentalist state in which all aspects of society are governed by Islamic law. Yet bin Laden condemns the Saudi government for serving the interests of American imperialism!

As he became more famous, bin Laden downplayed the specifically Saudi grievances that dominated his early statements and focused more on the Palestinians and the deaths of Iraqi children because of sanctions. Thus in his videotaped message of October 7, 2001, after the attacks of September 11, he declared:

What America is tasting now is nothing compared to what we have been tasting for decades. For over eighty years our umma [the Islamic world] has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its holy places are violated, and it is ruled by other than that which God has revealed. Yet no one hears. No one responds …

A million innocent children are being killed as I speak. They are being killed in Iraq yet they have done nothing wrong. Yet we hear no condemnation, no fatwa from the reigning sultans. And these days, Israeli tanks wreak havoc in Palestine, in Jenin, Ramallah, Rafah, Beit Jalah and elsewhere in the land of Islam, and we do not hear anyone raising his voice or moving.

(bin Laden 2001)

Bin Laden’s statements invariably focus on what he sees as oppression of Muslims by the United States and Israel, rather than on moral issues like the status of women or homosexuality. He would of course take very conservative, if not reactionary, positions on such issues, but he rarely mentions them in his public statements. His emphasis on the suffering of the Palestinians and Iraqis has made him a hero even in the eyes of many Muslims who might be unsympathetic to his goal of a totalitarian Islamic state. Gilles Kepel found that even Arab girls in tight jeans saw bin Laden as an anti-imperialist hero. A young Iraqi woman and her Palestinian friends told Kepel in the fall of 2001, ‘He stood up to defend us. He is the only one’ (Kepel 2002: 65–6). Bin Laden’s heroic stature in the eyes of many Muslims is illustrated by the following joke often told after September 11, 2001. A woman is walking toward the men’s room in a restaurant. Several employees of the restaurant try to stop her. She then asks, ‘Is Bin Laden in this restroom?’ They say no, and she responds, ‘Then I can go in because there is only one man left in the Arab and Muslim world: him’ (Kepel 2002: 41). This joke reflects the sense of impotence and the rage that pervade much of the Islamic world.

Such anecdotal evidence of the sources of bin Laden’s appeal meshes with the evidence provided by public opinon surveys. For example, in March 2008, Professor Shibley Telhami and Zogby International surveyed 4,046 Arabs in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Telhami 2008). When asked, ‘When you think about Al Qaeda, what aspect of the organization, if any, do you sympathize with most?’ 30 percent answered ‘That it confronts the US.’ 21 percent said, ‘I do not sympathize at all with this

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organization.’ 18 percent said, ‘That it stands for Muslim causes such as the Palestinian issue.’ Only 7 percent said, ‘That it seeks to create an Islamic state like that of the Taliban in Afghanistan.’ In other words, most Arabs who sympathized with al-Qa’ida did so either because it defied the US or because it championed causes like that of the Palestinians. Such causes are essentially nationalistic, but are widely viewed – in the Islamic world – as involving Muslims fighting domination by infidels.

There are two common forms of myopia regarding the appeal of Islamic militancy. There is a tendency on the Right to focus only on the reactionary and anti-Semitic dimensions of such movements, while there is a tendency on the Left to focus only on the nationalistic, anti-imperialist, and social grievances they articulate. It is important to recognize that there is some truth to both perspectives. As a practical matter, diminishing the appeal of Islamic militancy entails addressing the nationalistic, anti-imperialist, and social grievances that fuel it. But it also entails encouraging a more tolerant interpretation of Islam.

Conclusion

The use of ‘fundamentalism’ as an analytical category for comparative purposes remains controversial. In fact, one good reason to avoid the term is to avoid having to waste time defending it. That said, we can discern a fundamentalist impulse in the Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh movements commonly called fundamentalist insofar as they insist on strict conformity to holy writ and to a moral code ostensibly based on it. (The actual links between moral codes and sacred scriptures are sometimes more tenuous than religious conservatives recognize.) Such an impulse is lacking in Hindu nationalism and it is not of equal significance in all Christian, Jewish, and Muslim movements.

We have seen that militant religious Zionism has a very strong nationalist dimension, with the Maccabees seen as models of the Jew who refuses to submit to the Âgentile. It is very hard to draw the line between the religious and national dimensions of religious Zionist militancy. This makes it possible for secular Zionists firmly committed to the retention of the territories Israel won in 1967 to cooperate with militant religious Zionist settlers despite their lack of interest in a Jewish state based on strict conformity to religious law. Militant religious Zionists would agree with most religious conservatives on issues like homosexuality and abortion, but their political activities have focused primarily on settling and retaining the land Israel won in 1967 rather than on moral issues involving the regulation of personal conduct.

There is also a nationalist and anti-imperial dimension to most Islamic militancy. Hamas is a fundamentalist movement in the sense that it advocates a state based on strict conformity to Islamic law, and the followers of Hamas are expected to follow a strictly Islamic code of conduct. At the same time, however, Hamas is clearly a Palestinian nationalist movement that echoes most of the traditional demands of the Palestinian Liberation Organization before it accepted the idea of the partition of pre-1948 Palestine into a Jewish state on 78 percent of the land and a Palestinian state on the remaining 22 percent (Munson 2003a). To speak of Hamas only in terms of its fundamentalist and anti-Semitic rhetoric while ignoring its nationalist dimension would be to distort the nature of the movement (see Roy 2003). But it is also wrong to ignore its fundamentalist and anti-Semitic dimensions (see Litvak 2005).

The case of Shas illustrates the fusion of politicized religious conservatism with demands on behalf of an ethnic group that believes it has been discriminated against. To speak of Shas only as a fundamentalist movement without reference to the sense of ethnic grievance that fuels it would be, once again, to ignore the social and political context that produced it. Just

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as religion often serves as a badge of national identity, so too does it often serve as a badge of ethnic identity within nations.

To speak of all groups that have a fundamentalist dimension simply as ‘revolts against modernity’ is inadequate insofar as it tends to downplay or ignore the nationalist and social grievances that often fuel such movements. This is not to suggest that religious outrage provoked by the violation of traditional religious values cannot induce people to undertake political action. If someone believes that abortion is murder, then it is perfectly natural that such a person would engage in political action to prevent abortion. And it is a mistake to attempt to ignore what people say when they explain their political acts in terms of their religious beliefs and assert that they really do what they do because of some sort of alleged disorientation caused by ‘rapid modernization’. But while we should avoid reducing all apparently religious motivation to underlying secular causes, we should also recognize that moral outrage provoked by the violation of traditional religious values is sometimes meshed with outrage provoked by nationalistic and social grievances. (This too may be a form of moral outrage.)

Comparing the various politicized forms of religious conservatism and religiously tinged nationalism is useful. But this must be done with careful attention to the distinctive features of the movements in question and the specific historical contexts that have shaped them. The neglect of such features and contexts can transform comparison into caricature.

Bibliography

Almond, G. A., R. S. Appleby, and E. Sivan (2003) Strong Religion: the Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Appleby, R. S. (1995) But All Crabs are Crabby: Valid and Less Valid Criticisms of the Fundamentalism Project. Contention 4 (3): 195–202.

Aran, G. 1991. Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism: The Bloc of the Faithful in Israel (Gush Emunim). In Fundamentalisms Observed, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

This is an excellent ethnographic overview of national-religious settlers.

Beale, D. O. (1986) In Pursuit of Purity: American Fundamentalism since 1850. Greenville, SC: Unusual Publications.

Berger, P. (1997) Secularism in Retreat. The National Interest (Winter 1996/97): 3–12.

bin Laden, O. (2001) The Arabic original of bin Laden’s message of October 7, 2001 was at one time accessible at http://www.alitijahalakhar.com/archive/35/here35.htm (last accessed April 9, 2005). I have used my own translation. This message is also translated in Lawrence 2005: 103–5.

Bruce, S. (1998) Conservative Protestant Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. ——Â(2000) Fundamentalism. Cambridge: Polity.

Carroll, J. (2001) Constantine’s Sword : The Church and the Jews, a History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Faux, E. (2008) Le nouvel Israël: Un pays en quête de repères. Paris: Seuil.

Halliday, F. (1995) Fundamentalism and the Contemporary World. Contention 4 (2): 41–58. Heilman, S. C., and M. Friedman. (1991) Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The Case

of the Haredim. In Fundamentalisms Observed, edited by M. M. E. and R. S. Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

This is an excellent introduction to the ultra-Orthodox, although it might be confusing to students with no knowledge of Judaism.

Hirschberg, P. (1999) The World of Shas. New York: The Institute on American Jewish–Israeli Relations of the American Jewish Committee.

This is an excellent and readable introduction to Shas, although it does not cover the many important developments since 1999.

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Juergensmeyer, M. (2000) Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kepel, G. (2002) Chronique d’une guerre d’Orient. Paris: Gallimard.

Khomeini, R. (1977) Durus Fi Al-Jihad Wa-Al-Rafd: Yusatiruha Al-Imam Al-Khumayni Khilal Harakatihi Al-Nidaliyah Al-Ra’idah. S.l.: s.n.

——Â (1981) Islam and Revolution in the Middle East: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Translated by H. Algar. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press.

Lawrence, B., ed. (2005) Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden. London: Verso. This is the best anthology of bin Laden’s statements in English. It is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand bin Laden.

Lehmann, D. and B. Siebzehner (2006) Remaking Israeli Judaism: The Challenge of Shas. New York: Oxford University Press.

Litvak, M. The Anti-Semitism of Hamas, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, 2005 (http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=345, last accessed October 5, 2008).

Lustick, I. 1988. For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. New York: The Council on Foreign Relations.

This remains a classic study of the militant national-religious movement in Israel.

Mahmood, C. K. (1996) Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants. Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

This presents a good overview of the militant Sikh perspective.

Marsden, G. M. (1991) Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism. Grand Rapids, MT: W. B. Eerdmans.

This is an excellent and readable introduction by a respected evangelical historian.

Martin, W. C. (1996) With God on our Side: the Rise of the Religious Right in America. 1st edn. New York: Broadway Books.

This is an excellent and readable narrative history. Broadway Books published a revised edition in 2005 with a brief ‘Afterword’ covering events since 1996.

Marty, M. E. and R. S. Appleby (1991a) The Fundamentalism Project: A User’s Guide. In Fundamentalisms Observed, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—— and ——Â(1991b) Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family. In Fundamentalisms Observed, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Munson, H. (1988) Islam and Revolution in the Middle East. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ——Â(2003a) Islam, Nationalism, and Resentment of Foreign Domination. Middle East Policy 10 (2):

40–53.

——Â(2003b) ‘Fundamentalism’ Ancient and Modern. Daedalus 132 (3): 31–41.

——Â (2004) Lifting the Veil: Understanding the Roots of Islamic Militancy. Harvard International Review 25 (4): 20–23.

——Â(2005) Religion and Violence: A Review Essay. Religion 35/4 (October 2005): 223–246. ——Â(2008) ‘Fundamentalisms’ Compared, Religion Compass 2/4: 689–707.

Norton, R. A. (2007) Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. This is the best overview of Hezbollah in English.

Oberoi, H. (1993) Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History into Theory. In Fundamentalisms and the State, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pape, R. (2005) Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House.

This is an influential study stressing that terrorism often assumed to be motivated primarily by Islamic fundamentalism is actually primarily aimed at resisting foreign occupation. Pape goes too far in downplaying the role of Islamic fundamentalism and he focuses too much on resistance to foreign occupation as opposed to resistance to foreign domination in general. This is, nonetheless, a very important book.

Ravitzky, A. (1996) Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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This is a classic intellectual history, but it is difficult reading for students with no knowledge of Judaism.

Raychaudhuri, T. (1995) Shadows of the Swastika: Historical Reflections on the Politics of Hindu Communalism. Contention 4 (2): 141–62.

This is very useful although some might argue that Raychaudhuri is unfairly critical of Hindu nationalism.

Ribuffo, L. P. (1983) The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

This is a valuable work.

Roy, S. (2003) Hamas and the Transformation(s) of Political Islam in Palestine. Current History, January, 13–20.

Said, E. W. (1992) Impossible Histories: Why the Many Islams Cannot be Simplified. Harper’s Magazine, July. Accessed through Academic Search Premier.

——Â(1993) Culture and Imperialism. 1st edn. New York: Knopf.

Sengupta, S. (2002) Oh, the Heartache! They Want Cupid Banished. New York Times, February 12, 2002. Shulman, D. (2007) Dark Hope: Working for Peace in Israel and Palestine. University of Chicago Press.

This is an excellent account of how ‘dovish’ Israeli intellectuals have tried to prevent ‘nationalreligious’ settlers from attacking Palestinians.

Sprinzak, E. (1991) The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right. New York: Oxford University Press.

This is an excellent and essential study of Israel’s religious-nationalist settlers and their supporters, but it is difficult for students with little or no knowledge of Israeli politics.

——Â(1999) Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination. New York: The Free Press.

Like The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right, this is excellent, but difficult for students with little or no knowledge of Israeli politics.

Telhami, S. (2008) 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International). Accessible at http:// sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm (last accessed October 5, 2008).

Viorst, M. (2002) What Shall I Do with This People?: Jews and the Fractious Politics of Judaism. New York: Free Press.

This is an excellent and readable introduction to the political role of Judaism in modern Israel and to Jewish history in general.Â

Wade, W. (1987) The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America. New York: Simon and Schuster. This remains an excellent and very readable source although it does not cover recent decades.

Suggested reading

Bergen, P. L. (2006), The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda’s Leader. New York: Free Press.

This is an insightful portrait of bin Laden based primarily on interviews with people who have known him.

Heilman, S. (1992), Defenders of the Faith: Inside Ultra-Orthodox Jewry. New York: Schocken Books. This is a wonderfully human and readable ethnographic study of ultra-Orthodox Jews of European origin in Israel.

Hirschberg, P. (1999), The World of Shas. New York: The Institute on American Jewish–Israeli Relations of the American Jewish Committee.

This is an excellent and readable introduction to Shas, although it does not cover the many important developments since 1999.