Материал: Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

officially (the insider is believed to have reached a sector which is beyond the l–the PP layer undetected).

The PPS efficiency indicator is the key quality indicator that characterizes the PPS application for the purpose it is designed for. Still, practically, any system is also characterized by other indicators. Thus, an important factor is the system creation and operation cost. Other properties of the system (reliability, noise resistance and others) are also important.

An assessment of the PPS for each of these properties requires:

∙selection of the quantitative indicator that characterizes the given property;

∙development of the assessment procedure;

∙existence of needed initial data.

∙For example, the quantitative indicator of expenditures is the cost of the necessary PPS equipment and the work to equip the nuclear site with engineered physical protection features. Cost estimate is a fairly simple and traditional technique of calculating cost indicators. The dimension of this indicator (ruble or USD) is also clear.

The reliability of a system of EPPFs, as of any other engineered system, is characterized by indicators of fail-safety (mean operating time to failure and others), maintainability (mean time to repair and others), etc.

Noise resistance is normally characterized by such indicator as mean operating time to false actuation of equipment.

Indicators that describe such “fine” properties of systems as the alarm deployment speed (for mobile equipment), masking capabilities and others can be also used.

Respective techniques exist which enable these indicators to be qualitatively estimated. Also there are respective source databases.

A note should be made that the work to acquire necessary initial data, prepare for calculations and assess immediately the PPS efficiency requires a great deal of routine operations and computations. Furthermore, efficiency is assessed more than once in the conceptual design process as the best (reasonable) decisions are chosen. These and many other factors inevitably lead to the necessity of automation of the PPS efficiency assessment procedure and, consequently, development of dedicated computer programs being recognized. The technological revolution in creation and application of personal computers has made this task both vital and feasible.

There is a range of US dedicated PPS efficiency assessment codes widely known in Russia, including the following:

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∙EASY, SAVI – MS DOS programs intended to assess the PPS efficiency as applied to an “external” threat [2];

∙ЕТ – an MS DOS program intended to assess the PPS eff iciency as applied to an “internal” threat;

∙ASSESS – a WINDOWS program intended to assess the PPS efficiency as applied to an “external” or an “inter nal” threat or a conspiracy between an outside intruder and an insider, and to calculate the probability of neutralizing an armed adversary [3].

ASSESS, a code delivered to Russian nuclear operators in the framework of international cooperation, is the most popular of such programs in Russia. It has a number of significant advantages as compared to earlier US dedicated computer programs.

However, a number of shortcomings limiting the program application in Russia were found in ASSESS by Russian experts in the process of its operation and as practical experience was acquired. One of these is the rigid response force tactics built in ASSESS, which is not comprehensively applicable to specific conditions of Russia. Apart from this, ASSESS does not have a database on real performance of EPPFs and PBs with respect to classified information.

Dedicated PPS efficiency assessment codes are also developed in Russia with utmost emphasis laid on applications specific to Russia. One example is ВЕГА–2, a computer program designed to assess the PPS efficiency for both external and internal threats and enabling calculations based on analytical methods and simulations [4].

Of special note is ВЕГА–2’s software solution that offers a more flexible description of the response force and potential attacker tactics, makes an allowance for the target designation function of detection sensors (essential to sites with a branched tree of attacker targets), makes it possible to estimate contributions from the closed-circuit television system at different PP layers, etc. ВЕГА–2 is continually perfected and upgraded given its practical onsite operations.

References

1.Измайлов А.В. Методы проектирования и анализа эффективности систем физической защиты ядерных материалов и установок. М.: МИФИ, 2002.

2.Описание компьютерной программы SAVI. Sandia NL, 1990.

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3.Описание компьютерной программы ASSESS. Материалы трейнинг– курса по обучению пользования программой. LLNL, США, 1995.

4.Описание компьютерной программы «ВЕГА–2». ГУП СНПО «Элерон», Минатом России, 1999.

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CHAPTER 9

PPS INTERACTIONS WITH THE NM ACCOUNTING AND

CONTROL SYSTEM

Though differing greatly, the above physical protection systems and NM accounting and control systems are assigned to the same task of ensuring security of nuclear material.

A question arises of whether these can interact to ensure a higher level of NM security. This, quite reasonably, suggests that the “autonomy” of interacting systems should be however maintained so that not to disturb the established organizational structures typical of Russian nuclear sites.

The following types of interactions between PPSs and NM A&C systems may be discussed:

∙technical;

∙organizational;

∙informational.

Technical interactions suggest that one and the same elements are used by the systems to address the tasks they are assigned to. Thus, one and the same TV camera can be used both for the NM control and containment in the NM A&C system and for the situation assessment purposes in the PPS.

Room door seals are also examples of such shared components.

Still, such sharing of components brings to life a great deal of organizational problems, e.g. relating to the division of responsibilities for the operation of the given element and so on.

Organizational interactions of the PPS and the NM A&C system require personnel of these systems to interact in various situations, which is to be set forth in respective regulatory documents (instructions, bylaws, programs).

Modern PP and NM A&C systems are expected to include a computerized data handling function, so informational interactions between them can be achieved at the level of each system’s databases.

Here is an example to illustrate this. Suppose there is a need for an authorized NM movement between two material balance areas (MBA) within the same site. A request is made out with the NM A&C system handling it and “informing” the PPS of the forthcom ing transaction (place, time, personnel with respective permits).

The PPS then formalizes respective clearing procedures (admission to the building, to the NM storage room and so on), these to be further realized via respective walks-through.

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A simplified example of a procedure to transfer NM between two MBAs is shown in Fig. 9.1. It can be seen that both systems operate alternately, ensuring so integrated control of the nuclear material handling operations. The security system will take any deviation from or omission in an action as a situation of alarm.

If materialized, this approach helps raise the security status of NM.

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