References
1.Ядерное нераспространение / Под ред. В.А. Орлова. В 2 т. М.:
ПИР Центр, 2002. Т. II.
2.IAEA Safeguards: Guidelines for States’ Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials. – IAEA/SG/INF/2, IAEA, Vienna (1980).
3.Концепция системы государственного учета и контроля ядерных материалов: Постановление Правительства РФ от 14 октября 1996 г.
№.1205.
4.Основные правила учета и контроля ядерных материалов. НП-030-
05.Утверждены постановлением Ростехнадзора России от 26 декабря 2005 г. № 19, Москва, 2005.
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CHAPTER 6
HUMAN FACTOR IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL
ACCOUNTING, CONTROL AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION.
AC&PP CULTURE
6.1. Present-day threats to safe management of nuclear materials and systems of counteraction
The main threats to a nuclear facility analyzed are:
∙theft of nuclear materials and NM-based products, or of information about nuclear materials and technologies;
∙acts of terrorism or sabotage at a nuclear installation or a NM storage facility;
∙nuclear blackmail;
∙anomalies in the processes of onsite NM handling or storage.
An anomaly is a discovered discrepancy between the physical material inventory and the accounting records in a material balance area. Anomalies include:
∙NM shortage (excess);
∙mistakes in accounting or reporting documents;
∙damage to NM-containing products or tampering indication devices (TID);
∙infringement of NM use or handover procedure;
∙inventory difference (ID) values gone beyond the permissible limits.
The above threats may be carried into effect by various perpetrators. A perpetrator is a person who has committed or is trying to commit an unauthorized action, or an accomplice to such an action. Nuclear sites will normally be protected against perpetrators of two types: outsiders and insiders. The latter are particularly dangerous as they may not only know the vulnerable points of a facility and its physical protection system, but may also have access to such points and to the related information.
The above threats can have severe consequences, including production of nuclear explosive devices and their unpredictable subsequent uses. NM AC&PP systems are means of counteracting threats coming from both outside and inside perpetrators. The importance of such systems on nuclear sites has grown dramatically in the face of the rising activity of terrorist organizations in the world.
A special case is a perpetrator unaware of the offense he commits. This category includes:
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∙nuclear site personnel negligent of their duties;
∙employees who are not competent enough to fulfill their duties, etc.
Such perpetrators are not motivated for unauthorized action, the adverse effects of which may be none the less serious.
Human factor and site security
The notion of ‘human factor’ refers to the integral characteristics of man and machine manifested under specific conditions of their interaction in the form of man–machine interface, which will function as dictated by the objective set for it. Personnel are responsible for operation of systems, they tend and control them, respond to the signals generated by them, and make decisions on allocation of resources for NM AC&PP. Such strong dependence on human factor leads to certain risks. Analysis of the reasons for failure at the man-machine interface shows 30 to 60 percent of all malfunctions to be caused by site personnel. Moreover, it is an unquestionable fact that the probability of an operator’s error will grow once an off-normal situation or an emergency arises.
Even specialists will not always realize the extent of incidents and problems accounted for by human factor. The truth of this statement, though, is supported by statistics. In 2001, 16 cases of failure caused by human errors were reported by Russian NPPs. Analysis of the events at nuclear plants in 2001 showed inadequate safety culture to underlie all those occurrences. The failures were attributed to:
∙flaws in or absence of administrative and operating regulations;
∙unsatisfactory distribution of duties and responsibilities;
∙imperfect site systems for personnel training and retraining.
6.2. The concept of nuclear safety culture
Analysis of the Chernobyl catastrophe led to a revised attitude towards the issues of safe operation of nuclear plants all over the world. Human factor was pointed out by the IAEA experts as the most important one among all possible risks. That is why the IAEA names safety culture as the crucial condition for nuclear power development [1]. The principles of safety culture are applicable to all nuclear facilities.
According to the IAEA definition, “Safety Culture i s that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”.
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Safety culture manifests itself, first of all, in such a working atmosphere in which assurance of nuclear facility safety becomes the key purpose as well as an inherent need of every individual, leading to self-control, concentration and a feeling of responsibility for any safety-related activities.
Thus, safety culture as applied to every employee of a nuclear site implies:
∙qualifications and psychological fitness for handling nuclear material and equipment;
∙strict compliance with operating rules (working discipline).
∙As applied to site personnel as a whole, safety culture implies creating:
∙an atmosphere of attention to safety issues and support of related initiatives (safety awareness);
∙an atmosphere in which personnel will not be afraid to speak openly about their mistakes and will be encouraged to report the facts that may impair safety (critical attitude);
∙an atmosphere of outspokennes owing to which any information related to the facility safety will be easily accessible to all (communicativeness).
Safety assurance in operation of a nuclear facility is the primary objective shared by all specialists involved in the activities on the site. This means that safety culture should be shown at all levels, i.e., at organizations with different positions in the administrative hierarchy, such as ministry/department, operating organization, enterprise/company, etc., as well as in behavior of every individual.
6.3. Development of the NM AC&PP culture
To study the culture of NM AC&PP as a specific aspect of safety culture, it is necessary first to have it defined in a way consistent with the above.
NM AC&PP culture may be interpreted as a combination of attitudes and values of organizations and individuals, which demands that NM AC&PP issues, as those of high priority, should receive the attention dictated by their significance.
The IAEA experts suggested that the final document of the associated Technical Meeting should include a definition to the effect that:
Safety culture is a combination of qualities, principles, relations and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutes that serves to support and improve nuclear safety.
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The concept of culture embraces a whole number of factors, such as availability of highly qualified personnel; a well-developed organizational framework, etc. The objective of culture development (with the role of human factor reduced) is only attainable by taking a comprehensive approach, including, inter alia, formation of an organizational infrastructure, education and training.
Principles of nuclear safety culture
∙Responsibility – AC&PP activities are most effective if every specialist assumes personal responsibility for the system operation, as well as for his/her actions in fulfilling working duties.
∙Guidance – AC&PP activities are most effective if management of all levels daily manifest in word and deed their commitment to ensure security of nuclear materials.
∙Motivation – personnel will show high performance if they see reasons for excellence, including motives introduced by management and colleagues.
∙Professionalism and competence – AC&PP systems show optimal performance where personnel are highly qualified and have knowledge and skills sufficient for good work in all its aspects, for correct and prompt response to all off-normal occurrences and emergencies.
∙Training and improvement – the probability of incidents may be reduced and high performance attained by improving the personnel qualifications, their general education level and intellectual abilities, by applying advanced practices and the knowledge previously gained.
Improvement of the national legal framework for nuclear material managemen
Practically all articles of the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy are based on the idea of safe development of the Russian nuclear industry. The effect of human factor on the safety of nuclear facilities is expressed by the Law in its provisions for the rights and duties of individuals, organizations and office bearers.
The Law provides legal regulation of nuclear activities in various forms, with some of them imposed as mandatory actions. These include physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials.
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