∙performs surveillance of NM accounting and control systems at organizations;
∙oversees physical protection and other aspects of the safety and security
of nuclear materials and installations;
∙inspects nuclear facilities;
∙takes disciplinary actions (injunctions, fines) if licensing conditions or safety rules are violated.
8.In some cases, plans for siting and building nuclear installations caused negative sentiments in certain groups of population. For this reason, the Law has special provisions as to who makes such decisions and on what grounds they are made. In particular:
∙a decision on building a nuclear installation is taken by the RF Government;
∙a decision on siting a nuclear installation is taken jointly by the RF Governments and the local administration;
∙a decision on siting and building a nuclear installation is made considering the need for such a facility and the conditions required for its siting.
9.The Law defines the main requirements to be met by Operators, i.e. the organizations declared fit for handling nuclear materials. An Operator should be licensed to carry out nuclear activities, should have sufficient resources for fulfilling its functions, and is fully responsible for the safety of NM handling, providing:
∙records of individual exposure of the site personnel;
∙protection of personnel and population in case of an accident at the nuclear facility;
∙NM accounting and control;
∙physical protection of facilities and materials;
∙radiation monitoring;
∙recruitment, training and retraining of the site personnel.
∙Unauthorized public events, such as meetings or strikes, are banned on nuclear facility sites and in their control areas.
10.In areas of NM handling, e.g., storage and processing, reliable radiation protection measures should be provided for the site personnel, local residents and environment. During transportation of such materials, they are equated to cargo of particular hazard.
11.Physical protection of nuclear facilities is provided by their Operators and specially appointed authorities, or by crews if they are shipborne.
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Security requirements are established by the rules for physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Operation of a nuclear installation or use of nuclear materials are prohibited if no measures are taken for their physical protection (Articles 49, 50).
Limited rights of persons found on nuclear sites. For the sake of physical protection of a nuclear facility, the site personnel and visitors as well as their belongings and vehicles may be inspected, for which purpose special equipment may be used.
Admission to work. Persons may be admitted to work on a nuclear site, if they are properly qualified and have a clearance for work associated with state secrets.
Persons with health problems identified in a special list of medical contraindications, will not be permitted to work at a nuclear facility.
12.Operators bear liability for losses or damage caused by radiation impacts within certain limits. The scope of liability should be financially provided for by combination of in-house funds of the organization, its insurance policy, state guarantees, etc. Documentary evidence of such financial provisions is a prerequisite for granting a license to the applicant organization.
Russian Government will pay damages on account of radiation impacts in amounts exceeding the scope of liability of the operating organization.
13.Responsibility of officials. Violation of the RF Law on the Use of Atomic Energy entails disciplinary, administrative or criminal responsibility. Such violations include:
∙infringement of requirements for physical protection of a nuclear facility;
∙infringement of the order of NM accounting and control;
∙theft, illegal purchase, storage and sale of NM;
∙infringement of rules and regulations for nuclear energy uses;
∙violation of the license terms;
∙acceptance of a nuclear facility for operation without taking measures for protection of personnel and local population;
∙failure to fulfill their duties by the site personnel;
∙unauthorized absence from the workplace at the facility;
∙admission to work at the facility granted to personnel without appropriate qualification documents, having certain medical contraindications, and to persons under 18;
∙direct or indirect coercion of personnel to break the operating procedure or job instructions;
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∙assignment of personnel to work in high-exposure areas;
∙unjustified release of radioactive substances to the atmosphere, to water or underground environment;
∙concealment of the fact of an accident;
∙refusal to provide information, or distortion of information concerning the facility safety;
∙facts of putting into use products contaminated by radioactive substances;
∙infringement of the export and import order.
14.Export and import of nuclear installations, equipment, technologies and materials are carried out in compliance with the international agreements and obligations assumed by Russia for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Export and import are subject to special licensing.
Spent nuclear fuel is taken in to the RF territory from foreign countries in a way dictated by the Russian legislation and international agreements of the RF. If such an international agreement establishes rules other than those set by the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy, the rules of this international agreement will prevail (Articles 64, 65).
5.2. Regulatory framework for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials
The regulatory framework for NM management appears in the form of the rules laid down for such activities. Accounting and control of nuclear materials are covered by a series of regulatory documents at the international and national levels.
1.The IAEA recommendations for development of a state’s system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials (SSAC) [2].
2.The concept of a state system for accounting and control of nuclear materials (NM A&C) [3].
3.General rules for accounting and control of nuclear materials [4].
The concept of such a system adopted in Russia takes into consideration
practically all the international recommendations. It treats NM accounting and control as an important element in management of nuclear energy uses by the state. This document defines the hierarchy of objectives and the key operating principles of the State NM A&C system.
The objectives, arrangement and operation principles of NM A&C systems are discussed at greater length in the general rules for accounting and control of nuclear materials (NP-030-05), which is the key regulatory document where the requirements and criteria for A&C are determined.
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These requirements are mandatory to all legal and natural persons involved in NM management.
NP-030-05 contains a list of nuclear materials subject to accounting and control and specifies their threshold quantities. The basic principles of accounting and control identified in this document are those of continuity of knowledge, categorization, and measurable material balance.
Accounting and verifying measurements
It is only objective data, i.e. the results of quantitative measurements, that may serve as a basis for NM accounting and control in the new regulatory system. A principle central to this system is that of regular NM measurements, which naturally leads to a sharp increase in the extent of such operations. That is why measurements are differentiated according to their purpose: they may be aimed either at getting new information, as is the case, for instance, at facilities that fabricate NM-containing articles, or at verifying the existing NM data. Hence, measurements may be either of accounting or of verification nature.
Accounting measurements determine NM parameters in a batch, and their results (together with the measurement error) are entered in accounting documents as certification values. Every subsequent measurement cancels the result of the previous one. Such measurements cover all nuclear materials (100 % sampling).
Verifying measurements determine NM parameters in a batch or NM attributes to confirm the previous accounting data. The accuracy requirements for such measurements may be lowered.
Data verification if regarded as positive if the difference between its results and the accounting data is within the limits of allowable statistical straggling. As a rule, such allowable straggling in measurement results is determined by a 99 % confidence interval. If the discrepancy is found to be outside this interval, a new accounting measurement is to be made.
Access control equipment
The General Rules reflect the trend towards greater reliance on instrumentation in NM control. The Rules emphasize the importance of equipment for control of access to nuclear materials. Such equipment should be used wherever nuclear materials are found. Its purpose is to confirm the validity of previously measured NM quantities and attributes or to detect tampering with the materials. Though not providing NM security per se, this equipment will reveal attempted access to materials or will
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prove absence of such attempts. In the latter case, the previous measurement results may well be used, with the measurement costs reduced thereby.
Thus, instrumental methods of detecting and deterring attempts at tampering with nuclear materials are indispensable elements of modern NM A&C systems.
Sampling of nuclear materials
Sampling for verification is permitted if a nuclear material has undergone no changes and if it has been kept under instrumental access control. The extent of such measurements should be set to ensure the specified confidence probability of detecting an off-normal condition (anomaly). This probability depends on the extent of access control applications. An anomaly is detected by judging against the following values of threshold NM quantities:
a)for materials of Categories 1, 2 and 3, the threshold quantities are:
∙3 kg for plutonium and uranium–233;
∙8 kg for uranium–235;
b)for uranium enriched to less than 20 % (Category 4), the threshold quantity is 70 kg of U–235.
If nuclear materials appear as encased articles whose integrity is ensured by their design, they may be checked upon by sample measurements. The sampling extent is determined in a way similar to that of materials fitted up with tampering indication devices.
In-house measurement programs
Every organization develops a measurement program for the purpose of NM accounting and control, including:
∙measurement procedures, which are subject to governmental qualification. Measurements are made by destructive and nondestructive methods, each having its intrinsic advantages and disadvantages. Every method has its own preferred applications and, on the whole, they are complementary to one another;
∙a list of key measurement points, with instrumentation employed at each;
∙arrangement and description of measurement procedures;
∙measurement accuracy requirements, etc.
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