Материал: 62. Bara, B.G. Cognitive pragmatics the mental processes of communication 2011

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468  Bruno G. Bara

regard to the meaning of irony, a more general explanation compared to those advanced so far is that the ironic utterance constructs a possible scenario that acts as a background against which the element of alterity introduced by the speaker without mentioning it, and which the hearer will have to infer, will be highlighted by contrast. Against this background, different meanings may emerge, including Gricean opposites, Sperber and Wilson’s echoes, or Morgan’s transparent fictions.

Thus,in(11),thepossiblescenarioofatolerantwifestarklyforegroundsher attempt to kill her rival. In (12), the scenario, which is not merely possible but real, forcefully underscores how ridiculous the conflicting claims of the rival kings are. Even in the case of Buster Keaton’s wordless irony, what the actor does is construct a possible scene that patently reveals the total incongruity between the actor’s impassive behavior and the catastrophes occurring all aroundhim.Theelementthatrepresentsalteritymustemergebycontrast:white if the background is black, and black if the background is white.

Grice and those like Perrault who follow in the classical tradition focus essentially on the induction process the interlocutor must enact. However, they impose far too narrow confines, limiting it to the case, which is admittedly frequent, in which the emergent meaning is the opposite of the literal content of the utterance.

Sperber and Wilson concentrate on a particular type of scenario, one simulating a hypothetical agent, or one in which the speaker echoes thoughts of one or more agents. There is no doubt that this thesis furnishes a brilliant solution to some cases. However, not all cases of irony can be accounted for by echoic utterances. Turning to inductive processes, which Sperber and Wilson believe maybeexplainedbythesingleprincipleofrelevance,littleattentionisdevoted to shared knowledge, which plays such a central part in the planning and comprehension of ironic utterances.

Let us now move on to a more formal presentation of my theory. Actor A generates utterance p, which is incompatible with state of things r. She also believes she shares knowledge r with the addressee to whom the ironic utterance is directed, such knowledge having been adequately activated. Finally, her communicative intention is to contrast utterance p with background r.Any spectators present may be divided into those who share belief r with the actor and may therefore comprehend the ironic intent, and those who do not share belief r and are therefore unable to understand whatAreally meant.

The general formula representing this is as follows:

(13)BELA p ≠ r BELA SHBA r EXPRESSA p CINTA SHBA p ≠ r

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Cognitive pragmatics: The mental processes of communication  469

Recapitulating: since actorAis convinced that p is incompatible with r, and thinks that belief r is shared with B, she utters p ironically against the background of r.

All types of irony, antiphrasis included, fall within the scope of this gen­ eral framework. All that is required is to recall the concepts of simplicity and complexity introduced at the beginning of this chapter. I will speak of sim­ ple irony when the interlocutor can grasp speaker meaning instantly, mov­ ing directly­ from the utterance to the behavior game of which the utterance may be considered to be a move. Example (11) is a prototypical instance of simplicity.

In more formal terms, if, for the sake of clarity, we concede for one moment that r is the equivalent of non-p, A produces utterance p that contrasts forcefully and immediately with shared belief r (non-p).

I define complex irony as irony in which the interlocutor must carry out a series of inferences in order to grasp speaker meaning. This consists of an utterance q that does not directly come into contrast with shared belief non-p. However,performingaseriesofinferences(fromtheutteranceqtoitsimplicationp)willenablethehearertoarriveattheconclusionthatabeliefpisclearly incompatible with the activated scenario of shared beliefs. Example (12) is a prototypical case here.

Inmoreformalterms,andstillconcedingmomentarilyforthesakeofclarity that r is the equivalent of non-p, A produces utterance q from which p may be inferred, and which manifestly and instantly contrasts with shared belief r

(non-p).

We can thus use one single analytical framework to account for extremely differenttypesofirony,withouthavingtoforgointheanalysiseithertheinfantile prank or the most sophisticated sarcasm. I have discussed only the linguistic type of irony, but the same treatment can also be extended to extralinguistic irony, such as clapping one’s hands after somebody’s poor performance at a trivial task.

5.2.Deception

The meaning of deception from an evolutionary standpoint is to be sought in thepossibilityofintroducingintothestruggleforsurvivalandthereproduction of one’s genes components that are not limited to brute physical force. A cogent case in point is that of the small seahorse, which manages to introduce himself into the dominant male’s harem by pretending to be a female while the dominant male is too busy fighting off the official challengers. Despite their suggestiveness and the interest they arouse, these deceptions are limited since animals do not possess the mental capacities required to represent shared beliefs­ and communicative intentions, which means that they are unable to

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470  Bruno G. Bara

produce any form of communicative behavior, violations included, in the strict sense of the term.

For cognitive pragmatics, deception is a conscious violation of a shared behavior game. Though A knows she should act in a certain way in order to respect the behavior game being played by B and herself, she carries out a communicative behavioral act that is premeditated to make B believe it is a game move even while she knows full well it is a violation of that game.

Iwillnowpresenttheformulasnecessarytorepresentdeceptionincognitive terms. Temporal notation is obligatory. However, such notation will be suppressed in the exploration of the full example for the sake of simplicity. The deceptive utterance takes place at time t1; the beliefs and mental states preceding the utterance are indicated at time t0; the progressive consequences of the utterance are indicated at times t2, t3 . . . tn.

Summing up: A expresses utterance p, though not believing it herself, her communicative intention being that B take it as shared between them. If the deception works,Awill assume that B takes p as shared.

Stateddifferently,ontheonehand,AhopesthatBwillbelievep,andthathe isconvincedthatAherselfbelievesptoo;ontheotherhand,Acommitsherself tobehavingfortherestoftheinteractioninamannerconsistentwiththis“supposedly shared belief  ” (whereas B thinks it is shared, A does not believe it). From the standpoint of the cognitive resources required, the difficulty of deception consists in always keeping the private belief non-p (~p) and the supposedly shared belief p both active in her attentional space.

Thislattertypeofnonstandardcommunicativesituationrevolvesaroundthe relationship between the mental states that actorAcommunicates and the private mental states she actually holds.As we have noted previously, the conversation game is neutral with regard to the sincerity and correctness of the interlocutors’ behavior. Hence the participants may carry on a conversational dialogue that is correct from an external standpoint without ever communicating their mental states. For example, a promise may be expressed in an impeccable manner without there being any real intention to keep that promise. Indeed, from Delilah to Judas the best instances of treason have always been clothed in a form that aroused no suspicions whatsoever.

Not all acts of deceit have an equally complex structure. As for the other types of communication, the difficulty of an act of deception depends on the number of inferences B requires to reach the hidden game, starting from A’s untruthful communication act. To carry out or discover a well-planned deceit,

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several aspects will have to be taken into consideration, in addition to the simple fact of whether p is true or false. In principle, there is no limit to how complex a situation can be. Human beings are, however, incapable of dealing simultaneously with a high number of embeddings.

Employing the distinction between simple and complex speech acts once again enables us to establish a criterion by which to distinguish different levels of difficulty that a deceit may reach.

A simple deceit consists of the production of a communication act (  p) that contrasts with something (non-p) that would immediately allow the partner to identify what game the actor is trying to hide from him. Simple deceit, as I have defined it, is called lying in the literature.

A complex deceit consists in producing a communication act q, implying a belief (  p) that leads the partner toward a move or a game which is different from that he would arrive at if he had access toA’s private belief non-p.

Thus, lies and deceits are not always conceptually distinct.They fall along a continuum in which the lie constitutes the simplest level. The more complex the deceit, the greater the planning it requires. But even the most intricate deceit sometimes requires the telling of a lie, by which I mean an untruth. In this latter case, the lie is only the ultimate act finalizing a planning process that is potentially extremely complex.

In order to succeed, the deceit must not be discovered by the partner. If the partner discovers an attempt to deceive him, he may declare the fact or he may pretend he has not realized, in order to plan a counterdeceit, if he so wishes. The possibility of there being a counterdeceit demonstrates that A may simulate B’s mental processes only up to a certain point, and in any case the operation always involves a certain amount of risk.

Finally, deceits also may be produced through extralinguistic means, from pointing to a wrong location (simple deceit) to taking off one’s wedding ring before leaving for a conference out of town (complex deceit).

5.3.Failure

Eventhoughitmightatfirstseemparadoxical,fromthestandpointofcooperation, even a failure must be agreed on by the actors. In order to remain consistent with all the literature on the subject, I will continue to use the term failure in a generic sense to indicate all those cases that exhibit communicative failure at whatever level this might have taken place. I will introduce the term shared failure to indicate that particular case in which both the agents are aware of what has happened and accept the definition of the occurrence as constituting one of failure in the proper sense of the term. What I wish to underline is the fact that to define an occurrence as a shared failure both the agents must consciously recognize that there has been a nonnegotiable refusal, and that this

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refusalistobeconsideredassharedknowledge.Ifoneofthetwoagents,either Aor B, does not believe that this is what has happened, then the case cannot be classified as shared failure, despite the difficulties that have occurred.

We are now in a position to define a communicative failure as an abortive attempt to produce a given communicative effect on one’s partner. From A’s standpoint, communicative failure may come about in any of the first three stages I have hypothesized: at the level of the expression act, at the level of speaker meaning, or at the level of communicative effect. An interruption at any point along the communicative chain will produce a failure to achieve the speaker’sgoal,thatis,thespeakerwillfailtogenerateinherpartner’smindthe mental state she intended to generate.

There are three types of communicative failure: noncomprehension, mis­ understanding, and refusal. I discuss these in turn.

5.3.1.  Noncomprehension.  B fails to understand the expression act or the speaker meaning of whatAis saying.An interruption in the inferential chain is detected at the level of the conversational game. Since the predefined task of the pertinent metarule has not been completed, the regular flow of the successive stages is interrupted and the reaction stage is activated. In the reaction stage the partner decides whether to render the failure explicit, for instance by asking for clarification, or whether to handle the situation in a different way. Whatever option he does adopt, failure is transparent to him, and his choice of option is a conscious one. Noncomprehension is a case of transparent failure for B, for B is aware he has not understood whatAwas saying.

5.3.2.  Misunderstanding.  B fails to comprehend the expression act or the speaker meaning of what A is saying in the way she intended it to be interpreted. The inferential chain takes a different route from the oneAintended it to take. Misunderstanding is a case of opaque failure from B’s standpoint, in the sense that B is unaware that he has failed to understand whatAhas said.

5.3.3.  Refusal.  B understands whatAis saying, but refuses to comply with A’s orientation. In this case, the private mental states of B are involved, either intheattributionprocess(inferringprivatementalstatesofA),orintheadjustment process (modifying B’s own mental states), something followed a different route from the one A wished it to take. Refusal is a case of transparent failure for B, in the sense that it depends on a conscious decision on B’s part.

5.3.4.  The developmental approach to failures.  The study of failure is crucial from a methodological point of view, because it allows us to observe the intermediate erroneous outcomes of the communication process.Atheory able

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