Материал: JP-NOVA-XXI_era_vek_2020

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spreading the Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and expressed his concerns about the political isolation of India due to existing tensions with China. In these conditions, the rapprochement with Japan seemed, in Nehru's opinion, extremely important9.

Still, the Prime Minister Ikeda’s viewpoint turned out to be the opposite. He stated that the Japanese government’s attitude to the Chinese issue was different, so it did not intend to interfere or mediate in resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict. Moreover, he made it clear that, at the moment, Japan would adhere to the terms of the treaties of 195110 in its foreign policy.

At the same time, the Ikeda government paid special attention to its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy towards developing countries in Asia. In this connection, the main purpose of Ikeda's visit was likely to persuade India to reconsider its foreign policy principles in exchange for a promise to increase Japanese economic assistance11.

The factors, mentioned above, did not contribute to the strengthening of mutual trust between the governments of Japan and India. Hence, the results of the Prime Minister Ikeda visit to India demonstrated the differences existing between the two countries leaders in their foreign policy views. It also had no any significant impact on the further bilateral political cooperation in a regional interaction process as a whole. This is evidenced by the fact that the next

9Ibid.

10This refers to the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan signed simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Some of the articles of the Security Treaty were reconsidered further, and the new Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in 1960.

11Molodiakov V.E., Molodiakova E.V., Markar’ian S.B. Istoriia Iaponii. XX vek [The history of Japan. XX century]. 2nd ed. Moscow, IV RAN, Kraft+Publ., 2009., pp. 343-344.

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official visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to India was made only 23 years later.

The first half of the 1960s turned to be a difficult period for India, in which it was involved in two military conflicts - the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965. It was the time when the Japanese government demonstrated clearly its position of non-involvement in any interstate conflicts of other countries, thereby making it clear that creating a comprehensive cooperation with any country of the Asian region is not among its political priorities.

Since the border dispute escalation between India and China12 in 1959, both countries had still been unable to come to an agreement on resolving the territorial conflict in the Himalayas. Eventually, in October 1962 the Chinese army crossed the border, broke through the Indian defense and moved deep into Indian territory, invading disputed territory along the Himalayan border13. In these circumstances the Prime Minister J. Nehru had to send official requests for support to the heads of friendly governments, including Japan. In his message Nehru said: “The present Sino-Indian border conflict is not just a mere local border clash. This incident is a full-scale military act of aggression by China against India. Therefore, we appeal to the solidarity and seek for help and support of all friendly countries"14.

Replying to this the Japanese Prime Minister expressed sympathy with India over the difficulties thrust upon it by Chinese military action but did not intend to go beyond extending moral support. It was a neutral position which

12This refers to the Sino-Indian border dispute over the sovereignty of the territory in the Himalayas. The so-called McMahon Line was recognized by the Simla Convention (1914) between British India and Tibet, without the agreement of China.

13Chinese troops invaded about 2000 mile-long territory in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line.

14Okatachi Kohei. Ibid., p.94.

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Japan took, unlike the support pledge by most other “free nations”15.

At the same time the Prime Minister Nehru sent a request for military support to the US President J. Kennedy. The US government was about to provide military assistance to India, when in November 1962 China declared a ceasefire and announced its withdrawal to the northern point of the McMahon Line. Although the Chinese army left the invaded territory in the northeast, China claimed its presence in the strategically important Aksan Chin area in the northwest. As a result, China demonstrated its military advantage over India16.

Soon after the Sino-Indian military conflict had come to its end, Premier Ikeda reiterated the official position of the Japanese government on the issue by saying that “Japan was not thinking of either stopping trade with China or cutting down its economic commitment to India”17 . Moreover, he preferred not to make any comments on whether China’s actions were aggression against India or not, and said the following: “….we are to decide ourselves what role we are to play in the Sino-Indian border dispute….we are willing to extend aid so long as it is not military”18.

Then, on December 10, the Prime Minister said in his foreign policy speech to the Diet: “The reality of the armed Sino-Indian clashes in the border dispute has demonstrated

how unrealistic are advocacy of neutralism and mere calls for peace”19.

From the above it should be noted that there was some hope in Nehru’s government that Japan, keeping in mind the appearance of Indo-Japanese relations in the postwar decade, might offer its support in a severe situation. For that reason it

15Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 376.

16Iurlov F.N., Iurlova E.S. Ibid., p. 684.

17Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid, p. 376.

18Ibid.

19Ibid.

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came as a surprise that Japan even did not expressed any intention to.

In this regard, an Indian researcher P.A. Narasimha Murthy discusses the reasons for Japan's refusal to support India in its military clash with China as the followings.

Firstly, “it was one of those rare occasions when the Japanese government was able to demonstrate to the political opposition that it could take independent action on specific international issues like the Sino-Indian conflict. Whereas the United States had responded favourably to India’s call for support, Japan was non-committal”20.

Secondly, “the Sino-Indian border conflict came at a time when China and Japan were about to carry their economic relations to a new stage. In the circumstances a neutral stand seemed the best way out – one which did not jeopardize Tokyo’s already acquired economic interests in India, and goodwill and markets which were about to be gained in China”21.

Thirdly, “Japanese public reaction to the conflict remained mild and non-committal, as the public were more concerned about the crisis in Cuba than the local conflict in the Himalayas. Thereby, it induced official policy to move in the same direction”22.

One could say that the border war of OctoberNovember 1962 provoked the Indian public to reconsider the country's foreign policy principles. The international isolation and the defeat that India experienced during the conflict shattered the Indian leader’s faith in Asian solidarity. As the result, the Prime Minister J. Nehru decided to pursue a policy of containing China's influence in Asia that led to deepening the cooperation with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Pandit

20Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 377.

21Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., pp. 377-378.

22Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 378.

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Nehru never abandoned the idea of non-alignment in his foreign policy.

After the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri took over as Prime Minister of India. In the face of the formation of military ties between China and Pakistan and the first Chinese nuclear tests, conducted in 1964 and 1965, Shastri’s government proclaimed the State program for strengthening the defense capability of the country. It required both political and economic reforms, as well as renovation of the country's diplomacy. First of all, the new Indian government took measures to intensify military cooperation with both superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Prime Minister Shastri held a course for deepening cooperation with the Asian region countries, among which Japan could become a priority one as a developed Asian country which was in alliance with the United States.

At the same time some Indian and other foreign politicians made proposals “to persuade the two countries to match their perceptions and move towards concerted diplomatic action in order to infuse confidence among other Asian nations. Moreover, taking into consideration the fact that the balance of power in Asia had been upset and peace was disturbed by China, a corrective measures an Asiatic defense consisting of India and Japan was necessary”23. Needless to say that there was no any idea to create an “integrated military alliance in free Asia, but a diplomatic coalition of the stronger powers, in other words, a countervailing power to restrain China”24.

However, in the beginning of the 1960s neither India nor Japan was interested in such conception. The reason was that both countries leadership considered the best way to withstand pressure from China was to build their own

23Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 380.

24Ibid., p. 381.

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