Материал: JP-NOVA-XXI_era_vek_2020

ЯПОНИЯ XXI NOVA: эраи век

political, economic and military (that is for India) strength as soon as possible.

In summing up one may note that a “Chinese factor” had already appeared in the early 1960s in the concept of Indo-Japanese political relations. However, in that period of time it hadn’t yet played the role of the factor that could encourage for improving the convergence between the two countries. At the time of the 1960s Japan was aimed at developing its economic cooperation with the People Republic of China, while India was to protect its national interests and contain China by strengthening its military capability.

Soon after the Sino-Indian border clash, India was involved in another armed conflict with Pakistan, also known as the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. This conflict referred to the territorial dispute between the two countries over the state of Kashmir. Pakistan, claiming the entire Kashmir, did not recognize the division along the armistice lines25. Therefore, as an agreement on the Kashmir issue had not yet been reached, India and Pakistan remained in contention. Moreover, in March 1963 the foreign ministers of Pakistan and China signed a temporary border agreement in Beijing, according to which the Pakistani jurisdiction over the northern regions of Kashmir was recognized.

In the period of 1962-63 several rounds of negotiations were held between the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan through the mediation of the United States and Great Britain, but ended in vain 26 . As for Japan, its government, from the start, was not eager to take any action

25In the result of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948 Kashmir was divided into two parts, i.e. Indian and Pakistani. However, the Pakistani government continued to claim to the whole territory of Kashmir.

26Nasenko Iu.P. Vneshnepoliticheskie vozzreniia Dzhavakharlalu Neru [Jawaharlal Nehru’s visions on Foreign policy] // Mirovozzrenie Dzhavakharlala Neru [Jawaharlal Nehru’s ideology]. Eds. B.G. Gafurova, A.D. Litman. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1973, pp. 316-319.

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to mitigate the tense situation on the Indian-Pakistani border. The policy of Japan towards the subcontinent was to participate in economic development programmes of both India and Pakistan and not to get drawn in their disputes. In other words, Japan stood for “maintenance of parity which meant that a yen credit given to India must be matched with a similar yen credit given to Pakistan, and a fertilizer factory set up in India must be matched with a steel mill in Pakistan”27. It is natural to assume that the policy of avoiding the controversial Kashmir problem could ensure Japan's pursuit of development assistance to the subcontinent countries.

Ultimately, the unresolved Kashmir conflict caused a series of military clashes that took place from April to September in 1965 between India and Pakistan. Initially, the Indian army met with success, and soon after both sides turned to be in the statue of military confrontation28. In these circumstances, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan in order to force it to cease hostilities. Japan, following its ally, also suspended the assistance to Pakistan. However, it was only after the UN Security Council, following diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, appealed to the governments of India and Pakistan for a ceasefire that the parties agreed to hold peace talks. In the end, in January 1966, the Indian Prime Minister Shastri and the Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement, known as the Tashkent Declaration, under which the military forces of both countries were withdrawn to pre-war positions and the ceasefire was declared29.

Even after the Tashkent Declaration was signed, tensions prevailed between India and Pakistan. That was the reason why the United States announced suspension of all

27Narasimha Murthy P.A. Op. cit., p. 382.

28Iurlov F.N., Iurlova E.S. Ibid., pp. 687-688.

29Ibid., p. 688.

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economic and military assistance to India as well until the conflict with Pakistan was resolved. Japan again followed its ally and declared that “aid promised for 1965-1966 and all project aid to India would remain suspended”30. Therefore, this time the Japanese government took the position not to demonstrate its independence in action on specific international questions as it did in the case of the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1965.

From the Japanese perspective these measures seemed to be quite natural in terms of maintaining parity between India and Pakistan. However, from the Indian point of view “the parity idea was destructive and was used by interested nations to bend others to their will”31. In the case of the United States its actions seemed to be quite understandable for Indians, as the US, being an ally of Pakistan had its own reasons to suspend aid to India in order to keep following its policy in South Asia. Still, it was very difficult for the Indian government to understand the reason why Japan had decided to follow the parity principle, for Japan had never supplied any war materials neither to Pakistan nor to India.

In this regard, it’s worth citing Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao’s opinion32 that expressed all the disappointment of the Indian public over Japan’s actions. He said: “You (Japan) should distinguish yourself from others in the matter of aid to Asian nations. You should take an outstanding role (in the region)”33.

Nevertheless, despite the protest from the Indian side, it was not until 1969 when a resumption of Japanese project

30Narasimha Murthy P.A. Op. cit., p. 382.

31Ibid.

32Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao was an Indian economist, politician and educator. During his visit to Tokyo in 1966 he gave a speech at the meeting with members of the Committee for Studies on the Economic Development of India and Japan.

33Narasimha Murthy P.A. Op. cit., p. 383.

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aid was announced during the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s official visit to Japan.

It’s worth noting that the visit turned to be successful only in terms of the further development of economic cooperation between the countries. “In the joint communiqué issued on June 28, at the conclusion of the visit, the Japanese Premier agreed to resume project aid to India, starting with the development of the outer harbour of Vishakapatnam, and oil exploration”34. Thus, the Japanese government terminated the suspension of assistance to India that was announced in the result of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.

From a point of political relations, it seemed that the visit had deepened them with regards to security issues in the Asian region. For instance, the two Prime Ministers 35 exchanged views on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia issues, and also on the US campaign in the region. On the other hand, this visit did not bring any significant results in terms of intensifying the regional cooperation. It is remarkable that such burning topics as Kashmir, the Kurile Islands, and the problem of China were ignored during the summit meeting. «Regarding the Indo-Japanese state of interaction at this point, P. A. Narasimha Murthy noted in 1967, “There can be no meaningful Indo-Japanese political contacts if the two countries cannot support each other on these problems”»36.

34Annual Report 1969-1970 / Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi // MEA Library // [URL]: http://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2496?000 (accessed: 17.02.2020), p. 46.

35The Prime Minister of Japan Sato: Eisaku ( ) and the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi.

36Cit. ex: Ankit Panda. Asia’s Democratic Bulwark: A Theoretical Analysis of Strategic Convergence between India and Japan in the Early 21st Century / Princeton University Senior Theses // [URL]: http://www.ankitpanda.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Asias- Democratic-Bulwark-Ankit-Panda.pdf (accessed: 05.04.2020), p. 25.

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To conclude, the decade of the 1960s became the period when India and Japan visions on the global and regional issues were diverging significantly. Consequently, both governments failed to find any common points for building their cooperation that led to a long period of stagnation in their political relations.

References

1.Annual Report 1969-1970 / Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi // MEA Library // [URL]: https://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2496?000 (accessed: 17.02.2020).

2.Ankit Panda. Asia’s Democratic Bulwark: A Theoretical Analysis of Strategic Convergence between India and Japan in the Early 21st Century / Princeton University Senior Theses // [URL]:http://www.ankitpanda.com/wp- content/uploads/2012/06/Asias-Democratic-Bulwark-Ankit- Panda.pdf (accessed: 05.04.2020). 118 p.

3.Iurlov F.N., Iurlova E.S. Istoriia Indii. XX vek [The history of India. XX century]. Moscow, IV RAN, 2010. 920 p.

4.Molodiakov V.E., Molodiakova E.V., Markar’ian S.B. Istoriia Iaponii. XX vek [The history of Japan. XX century]. 2nd ed. Moscow, IV RAN, Kraft+Publ., 2009. 528 p.

5.Nasenko Iu.P. Vneshnepoliticheskie vozzreniia Dzhavakharlalu Neru [Jawaharlal Nehru’s visions on Foreign policy] // Mirovozzrenie Dzhavakharlala Neru [Jawaharlal Nehru’s ideology]. Eds. B.G. Gafurova, A.D. Litman. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1973. Pp. 166-184.

6.Narasimha Murthy P.A. India and Japan. Dimensions of their relations (historical and political). New Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1986. 431 p.

7.Okatachi Kohei . Nichiin kankei sho:shi(The history of Japan-India relations in brief). Tokyo, «Asia Economy», 1969. 107 p.

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