Материал: Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

Table 3.8

NM quantities under the IAEA Safeguards in states possessing no nuclear weapons (as of 1996)

It may be concluded that the system of IAEA safeguards is growing to global dimensions, and there is little material left uncontrolled. Nevertheless, implementation of these safeguards is not free from certain difficulties. The first to be mentioned among them are the problems

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associated with existence of the so-called “thresho ld” states and the efficiency of the safeguards themselves. In recognition of the above, the IAEA is taking steps towards strengthening the safeguards regime. In 1995, the Board of Governors of the Agency set up a committee for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards and entrusted it with drafting a model additional protocol seeking to improve the Agency’s capability to reveal undeclared nuclear activities. In 1997, the Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol prepared by the Committee as an addendum to the comprehensive agreements for application of the safeguards [5]. The Protocol comes into force after the Agency receives written notification made by a state on acceptability of the Protocol terms, or once it is signed by representatives of a state and the Agency.

At present, the IAEA member-states submit declarations with information on nuclear materials, on the processes these materials are involved in, and on nuclear facilities containing NM. The Protocol stipulates submission of an extended declaration on nuclear activities of a state. Such a declaration together with certain verification work should make the nuclear fuel cycle of a country and its associated activities more transparent. In addition to the data on all nuclear materials, an extended declaration will include information about all other nuclear activities, such as:

∙description of all processes and location of all facilities related to nuclear activities (industrial, R&D, personnel training);

∙identification of industrial, commercial and military facilities found in immediate proximity to nuclear installations.

Any process to produce nuclear materials or articles containing them is bound to leave some trace in the environment. The extent and nature of such traces depend on a number of factors, including the production technology, materials, loss limitation measures, and possible trails left by NM migrating beyond the nuclear site boundaries. Thus, the results of field tests in Sweden (1993) showed traces of nuclear activities in water and deposit samples up to 20 km away from the facility, depending on the local transport and water mixing conditions. Therefore, the Additional Protocol provides for wide application of sensitive environmental monitoring methods developed to detect traces of nuclear activities.

Provision of inspectors’ access to materials, equipment and installations is a key aspect in implementation of the safeguards. For regular inspections within the framework of the INFCIRC/153 Agreement, access should be provided to the places where such access was recognized as essential for

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fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by the Agency in regard to the safeguards. Extended access is a crucial factor in consolidating the system of safeguards. This implies access to any place at the facilities covered by the IAEA safeguards. The extended access approach also applies to the areas included in an extended declaration, which have no NM at all or contain small quantities of materials exempt from the safeguards, but are associated with the nuclear activities mentioned in the extended declaration. Besides, to enhance the transparency of nuclear activities, pursuant to the Additional Protocol, a state should seek to facilitate access to industrial, commercial or military installations located in the immediate proximity to nuclear facilities.

For a state which is a party to a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an effective Additional Protocol, review of all available information should show absence of not only any evidence of diversion of the safeguarded nuclear material, but also of undeclared nuclear materials or activities. Therefore, application of the safeguards is intended to lead to a positive conclusion that all nuclear materials in a state are placed under safeguards, with their use limited to peaceful nuclear activities, or are duly accounted for. For the Agency to be able to arrive at such a conclusion, it has to assess all state-level information resulting from implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, as well as all available and relevant information from other sources.

Confidence of the Agency and member–states in relia bility of the conclusions drawn from the results of safeguards application, is directly dependent on the quality of measures taken to collect, analyze and evaluate the relevant information. Such measures should be exhaustive, detailed and effective. Declarations made in accordance with the additional protocol present extensive information on national nuclear programs. Additional information arises from implementation of the extended access approach on the sites. The Agency collects substantial data from a wide spectrum of open sources with simultaneous assessment of their reliability, and applies new technologies, such as use of images from commercial satellites. The IAEA will also use the information voluntarily provided by member–states concerning export of nuclear materials, cases of illegal circulation of materials, etc. Assessment of the nuclear activities of a state is based then on three components:

∙ assessment of the national nuclear program on the strength of the evidence of non-diversion of declared nuclear materials; this serves as a bases for subsequent assessments;

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∙assessment made on completion of the additional protocol measures; it covers the information contained in the original extended declarations of states, as well as the results of actions pursuant to the additional protocol; and

∙conclusions arising from continuous monitoring of the national nuclear program.

By acting upon the Additional Protocol, the Agency can make national nuclear activities more transparent, while recognizing the right of states to protect their sensitive information.

3.2. Export control system

Export control is one of the key tools of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons [6]. It embraces a package of measures taken to ensure compliance with the effective international standards and rules for trade in materials, equipment and technologies potentially usable in production of nuclear weapons. The export control system is based on the licensing procedure for exporting the products and technologies covered by specially developed check lists. Export control is brought into effect at two levels: as international regimes and national systems.

The international regime of export control is built by joint efforts of states upon agreements between them, aimed at establishing control over export of products relating to development and production of nuclear weapons. International export control regimes are based on the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article III.2 of the NPT bans transferring to any non-nuclear-weapons state source or special fissionable material and equipment designed for production of special fissionable material, unless they are covered by the IAEA Safeguards.

The requirements of Article III.2 of the NPT are not exhaustive, however, and a number of issues were left unresolved, for example:

∙the equipment and materials meant for production of special fissionable material have not been specified;

∙the conditions for control over nuclear technology transfer have not been addressed;

∙nor have been addressed the conditions for control over repeated NM transfers;

∙the Article does not require that the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA be recognized. As a result, international NM transfers to non-signatory nonnuclear states have been regulated for many years by the incomplete IAEA system of safeguards described by INFCIRC/66.

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Zangger Committee

The awareness of these outstanding issues led states to set up international organizations, such as Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (London Club), which developed mechanisms and recommendations for control over international transfers of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and equipment. The states involved in these international activities are listed in Table 3.10.

In the period of 1971 to 1974, a group of states most advanced in the nuclear sphere (15 states at the beginning) held a series of meetings in Vienna. Professor Claude Zangger from Switzerland presided over those

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