meetings. The purpose of the meetings was to reach agreement on the following:
∙more specific definition of the equipment and materials intended for processing, use or production of special fissionable material;
∙development of the terms and conditions for regulating export of such equipment and materials in accordance with Article III.2 of the NPT.
The following terms for export of NM and equipment were agreed upon:
∙transfer of source or fissionable material is banned unless the material to be supplied is covered by the IAEA safeguards;
∙the equipment and materials included in the “Trigge r List” and intended for production of special fissionable material, may not be transferred unless the fissile material produced by this equipment is placed under the IAEA control;
∙materials and equipment may not be re-exported unless this material (equipment) is placed under the IAEA control.
The Trigger List drawn up by the Committee includes the following equipment and materials:
∙source and special fissionable materials;
∙reactors and reactor components;
∙non-nuclear materials for reactors;
∙facilities for reprocessing irradiated fuel and the associated equipment;
∙facilities for fabrication of fuel elements;
∙facilities for separation of uranium isotopes and the associated equipment;
∙facilities for production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and the associated equipment.
In 1974, the agreements of the Zangger Committee and the Trigger List of equipment and materials which may only be transferred under international control, was published by the IAEA as document INFCIRC/209.
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
The nuclear test carried out by India in 1974 made it clear that the Zangger Committee agreements had failed to bar completely the proliferation routes of nuclear weapons. In the same year of 1974, the major countries involved in supply of nuclear materials and equipment, set up the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) to supplement and reinforce the
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terms and conditions for nuclear export, formulated by the Zangger Committee. Like the latter, the NSG is based on a voluntary collective political agreement between its member–countries. S ince 1991, the NSG has had no official relations with the IAEA.
In 1976, the Group developed and published its fundamental document the Guidelines for Nuclear Export (INFCIRC/254). The NSG extended the List compiled by the Zangger Committee by adding uranium conversion processes, toughened up the requirements for their transfers to other countries, and introduced restrictions on supply of dual-purpose products.
Conditions for supply of products covered by the NSG list
Part 1 of the NSG Guidelines describes the supply conditions and includes a check list of materials, installations, equipment and components usable for production of special fissionable material. Unlike the Trigger List of the Zangger Committee, the NSG list extends controls to the technologies for production of items mentioned in the Trigger List.
The NSG interprets “technology” as technical data m aterialized, essential to design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities for enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production.
For items of the extended list to be exported, they should have physical protection at least at the level recommended by the IAEA. The NSG Guidelines prohibit export of source and special fissionable materials, of products and the associated processes mentioned in the check list:
∙to any non-nuclear country which has no obligations in law in regard to the full-scope IAEA safeguards;
∙unless the exporter is sure that the exports will be used for peaceful purposes.
Exceptions may only be made if:
∙the export is of importance to safe operation of an existing facility covered by the IAEA safeguards;
∙the export follows the agreements made before April 4, 1992 (NSG meeting in Warsaw).
Dual-purpose products and the conditions for their export
Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines contains the conditions for export and a check list of dual-purpose materials and equipment subject to export control.
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Materials and equipment are treated as dual-purpose products if they could significantly promote activities aimed at production of nuclear explosive devices.
The list of dual-purpose products includes:
industrial equipment: radial– and linear–rolling ma chine-tools; numerically controlled tools; vacuum furnaces; presses; robots; vibration testing equipment;
materials: aluminum; beryllium; bismuth; tungsten; zirconium, etc.; equipment for uranium isotope separation;
equipment of facilities for heavy water production (omitted in the Trigger List);
equipment for development of blasting systems; equipment for conducting explosions;
components and equipment for conducting NW tests; other items of export (tritium).
The Guidelines ban export of dual-purpose products and technologies subject to export control (on the list) to any non-nuclear country for use in activities relating to nuclear explosions, or in NFC facilities outside the IEAE safeguards.
Export control in Russia
Involvement of a country in international export control regimes implies:
∙provision of a national legal framework consistent with the adopted agreements;
∙adherence to the regime principles in the national policy;
∙participation in the forums of member–countries.
Export control law
The Export Control Law has been in force in Russia since 1999. It specifies the main methods of legal regulation of foreign-economic activities, such as:
∙identification of products and technologies under control;
∙licensing procedure for foreign trade in products and technologies under control;
∙customs control;
∙law enforcement measures applied to persons who have violated the foreign-economic regulations.
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A typical feature of this law is broad construction on the notion of export (Article 1). Foreign-economic activities embrace foreign trade, investments and other activities, including cooperation in international exchange of goods, information, services, and intellectual products.
In-house export control programs (IHECP)
IHECP establishment is made incumbent by the law (Article 16) upon all organizations involved in scientific or industrial activities associated with national defense and security of the RF and receiving profits from operations with products and technologies under control. Organizations will set up such programs to ensure compliance with the Russian laws and regulations in their foreign-economic activities in relation to goods, information, services, and intellectual products potentially usable for producing weapons of mass destruction. The National Research Center of the RF Physics and Energy Institute has developed a draft model IHECP for organizations in the Rosatom framework.
References
1.Бабаев Н.С., Адамов Е.О., Рыжов М.Н., Соболев И.А. МАГАТЭ. Грин Лон, 1997.
2.STATUTE as amended up to 23 February 1989 - International Atomic Energy Agency/
3.The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – INFCIRC/153, IAEA, 2008.
4.Safeguards Techniques and Equipment. /International Nuclear Verification Series, No.1 (Revised). - IAEA, Vienna, 2003.
5.Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between State and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards – INFCIRC/540, IAEA, 2008.
6.Владимирова С.В., Зябкин М.В., Клочко Г.Г., Левченко В.М. и др. Учебный курс по ядерному экспортному контролю. Обнинск: ГНЦ РФ ФЭИ, 2003.
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CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION SAFEGUARDS. SPECIAL MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND ITS ASPECTS
Reasons for special handling of nuclear materials
The idea of safe management of nuclear materials (NM) underlies any nuclear enterprise, including nuclear power, and is central to the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy adopted in Russia in 1995.
NM safety is a complex notion of many facets, such as nuclear safety; radiation and chemical safety; security, etc. All these aspects require appropriate conditions for NM handling, i.e. special management. Thus, special management is a combination of measures and means adopted to provide comprehensive safety of NM handling in a way that will be environmentally friendly and acceptable for the general public.
Considerable efforts have been made in the world towards such management of nuclear materials, these efforts aimed not only at NM security but also at the fullest possible knowledge of such materials. Safe NM management has three major aspects, i.e., accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials (AC&PP), which lie at the root of the national non-proliferation safeguards in Russia.
There are several factors that call for a special approach to nuclear materials.
1. Nuclear materials – at least some of them – are sufficiently valuable in commercial and energy terms. To illustrate this point, suffice it to mention an agreement signed in 1993, pursuant to which Russia was to supply 500 t of highly enriched uranium to the United States within 20 years, blending it down to a low enrichment level before delivery. The contract stipulates that the United States Enrichment Corporation shall convert the uranium to a form suitable for fueling nuclear reactors and shall sell it on the world market. For the 500 t of uranium, the US was to pay ~ $ 8 billion, which was tantamount to buying it at about $ 16 per gram of HEU. It goes without saying that the lower the material quality, the lower its price. World markets offer 1 kg of natural uranium for $ 60–80 (this figure, naturally, changing with time). Needless to say that nuclear materials are valued for their energy potential – t he whole nuclear power of the world relies on this property. The remarkably high calorific value of nuclear fuel is explained by the fact that every fission act liberates energy of about 200 MeV. For comparison, an act of chemical interaction between oxygen and carbon (fossil fuel burning) results in ~ 4 eV.
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