Материал: Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011
2.The second factor lies in the fact that nuclear materials – practically, all of them – are radiation and chemical hazards an d should be treated with due caution. The accident at the Mayak Facility (Kyshtym, Southern Urals) on September 29, 1957, was caused by a failure in the cooling system of a tank which stored 70 to 80 t of high-level waste from radiochemical processes. The Karachai Lake became a huge radioactive dump, which is still an enormous problem.
3.Nuclear materials are nuclear hazards. Many of them pose a potential threat of above-criticality. Poor accounting and erroneous actions can lead to uncontrollable chain reactions with severe consequences. The catastrophe at Chernobyl Unit 4 may be largely attributed to negligence of this factor.
4.The fourth factor, which is a risk not to be neglected, amounts to the fact that nuclear materials can be used for military or terrorist purposes, for production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. This factor is causing increasing anxiety in Russia as well as in the world at large and is the main reason for creating national systems of non-proliferation safeguards to stop the sprawl of nuclear weapons in the world.
National non-proliferation safeguards
At the national level, proliferation resistance is ensured by a number of factors, such as:
1.Legal and regulatory framework of the nuclear sector (laws, rules, decrees, regulations, directives);
2.Systems for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials in use at all nuclear sites of the country;
3.Organizations and systems set up to counteract illegal circulation of nuclear materials.
4.Professional culture of personnel working with nuclear materials and dissemination of the non-proliferation ideas for the broad public to comprehend the importance of this concept. The associated efforts include training of highly skilled specialists, retraining of nuclear personnel, public relations activities, etc. All the above may be referred to as nonproliferation culture.
5.Other activities, including international cooperation in the field of nonproliferation.
All these measures, systems and organizations together form the foundation of national non-proliferation safeguards, which are being implemented by states via their atomic energy authorities.
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Key components of NM management
NM AC&PP systems are being actively improved and developed at Russian nuclear facilities. This work proceeds along the following lines:
∙improvement of the legal and regulatory framework at the federal, departmental and site levels;
∙development, manufacture and use of up-to-date equipment and systems;
∙development and application of advanced AC&PP analysis and design methods;
∙upgrading of the export control system;
∙training and retraining of personnel.
Besides, Russia is involved in wide cooperation with the USA and West-European countries, which adds to the AC&PP progress on nuclear sites.
The AC&PP systems are schematically presented in Fig. 4.1. As may be seen, each of the systems embraces many measures and means. Although accounting, control and physical protection are provided by separate systems, their operational interdependence is quite obvious. This dependence is easily discerned from Fig. 4.1, if we assume one of the NM management components to be missing.
For the objectives of the national safeguards to be reliably attained, the ‘defense-in-depth’ principle should be used for NM protection. Protection in depth implies that failure of one of the security measures will not result in a significantly higher risk of NM diversion or theft. The above components of the national non-proliferation safeguards add up to provide such protection. In certain conditions, accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials are complementary activities contributing to the NM protection sought.
Such will be the case, for example, if protection is arranged against efforts of various perpetrators acting in conspiracy (e.g., between site personnel and guards), or if there are small NM leaks from the guarded site. Physical protection operates in real time. But detection of small leaks is problematic due to sensitivity thresholds of the NM detectors. In this case, the A&C system will be complementary to physical protection, as small NM diversions over fairly long periods of time will be diagnosed during periodical inventory processes on the site.
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Integral legal and regulatory framework.
ЕДИНАЯ ПРАВОВАЯ И НОРМАТИВНАЯ БАЗА.
ПРИНЦИПPrincipleКАТЕГОРИРОВАННЫХof categorized safeguardsГАРАНТИЙ. . ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКАSite characterizationОБЪЕКТА. Identification. ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕof threatsУГРОЗ И
НЕСАНКЦИОНИРОВАННЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ С ЯМ.
and acts of unauthorized NM handling
ЕДИНОЕ ИНФОРМАЦИОННОЕ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЕ
Coordinated information to support operation
ФУНКЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ СФЗУК ЯМ НА ОСНОВЕ of AC&PP systems based on computer networks
КОМПЬЮТЕРНЫХ СЕТЕЙ
Physical protection |
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Control |
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ФЗ |
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УЧЕТ |
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КОНТРОЛЬ |
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Accounting |
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DETECTION:ОБНАРУЖЕНИЕ‘Sensors’, "Датчики‘Communication’", "Связь", "‘SignalОценкаassessment’сигналов"
ACCOUNTINGУЧЕТНАЯ
ИНФОРМАЦИОННАЯINFORMATION
СИСТЕМАSYSTEM
NM LOCALIZATION |
ЛОКАЛИЗАЦИЯ ЯМ |
DETENTION:ЗАДЕРЖКА‘Passive "Пассивныеand active иbarriers’,активные барьеры‘Access", "Управлениеcontrol’
доступом"
ОТВЕТНЫЕ ДЕЙСТВИЯ
RESPONSE ACTIONS
"Силы ответного
‘Response forces’,
реагирования",
‘Equipment’, ‘Tactics’,
"Снаряжение", "Тактика",
‘Liaison’
"Связь"
NMИЗМЕРЕНИЯMEASUREMENTSЯМ И
КОНТРОЛЬAND THEIR
VERIFICATIONИЗМЕРЕНИЙ
ФИЗИЧЕСКИЕPHYSICAL
ИНВЕНТАРИЗАЦИИINVENTORY
NM INFORMATION
ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЕ СОХРАННОСТИ И ИНФОРМАЦИИSECURITYО ЯМ
SURVEILLANCEНАБЛЮДЕНИЕ
MEANSСРЕДСТВАOF NM
СОХРАНЕНИЯCONTAINMENTЯМ
ВЫПОЛНЕНИЕIMPLEMENTATIONНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХOF NATIONALГАРАНТИЙ ЯДЕРНОГОSAFEGUARDSНЕРАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЯ
Fig. 4.1. NM accounting, control and physical protection
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Operating environment of AC&PP systems
Interfaces between accounting, control and physical protection systems are based on their shared operating conditions. These conditions, governed by the specifics of NM handling processes on the site and of their information support, include:
∙attractiveness and quantities of nuclear materials (NM category) found on the site;
∙forms of NM localization on the site;
∙methods of information support to NM handling on the site;
∙site personnel.
It should be noted that AC&PP systems can never be effective unless their operating environment is duly taken into consideration. Operation modes of these systems are dictated by the NM types and quantities, the NM handling processes, and the information support they need.
As mentioned above, the levels of physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials depend on the inventory of NM found on the site and on the degree to which they may be attractive for diversion. The highest AC&PP levels are provided for such materials, the loss, theft or diversion of which may be most damaging to national security, human health or environment. Such an approach may be referred to as the principle of categorized safeguards.
The concept of NM localization lies in making NM accommodation as compact as possible and in providing security of these materials by setting up controllable barriers on the paths leading to them. This concept is usually implemented by placing NM in protected areas, access control zones, strong boxes, casks, etc. The higher is the localization degree, the simpler it is to protect and control the materials. The issues of NM localization are discussed at greater length in the second part of this book.
On-site NM handling is carried out in a way consistent with the concept of information security. This concept aims to provide complete information required for control of NM handling processes and, at the same time, to keep the information uses strictly within the limits of its intended purposes
– all under conditions of its protection against un authorized access.
In regard to personnel, both systems stem from the concept of safety culture. In other words, their purpose is to make personnel fully aware of the importance of safe NM handling and willing to achieve this end.
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Computer-based information technologies pave the way for more efficient interfacing of accounting, control and physical protection systems on nuclear sites. These systems, with their functions appropriately assigned, interact during operation, adding to the strength of NM protection in depth against actions of potential perpetrators.
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