Материал: Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

2.There are many countries today that have not joined the ranks of nuclear-weapons states. No wonder it is often hard to arrive at generally accepted decisions on further steps towards non-proliferation. To be more specific, a number of countries have their military nuclear programs but are not parties to the non-proliferation regime. Some of them, such as Israel, India and Pakistan, already have nuclear weapons in their possession, but refrain from their active deployment. Other states are, in a sense, ‘standing at the threshold’, as they initiated nuclear weapons programs in one way or another, but for some reason have stopped short at their production. Such states are Libya, Iran, North Korea, Brazil, and Argentina. Among the ‘threshold’ states, a special place belongs to the South African Republic, which built its own store of nuclear weapons but later – in 1990 – destroyed it. In most cases, an urge to possess nuclear weapons is caused by regional political problems between states and by the temptation of gaining a dominating role in the region.

It should not be forgotten that some countries (Japan, Germany, Sweden, Australia, etc.) are fully equipped economically and technically to produce nuclear weapons but are willingly committed to keep their nonnuclear status.

3.Breakup of the USSR in 1991 made an enormous impact on the global non-proliferation regime. The Soviet Union had always paid serious attention to safe use of nuclear materials, with the system of appropriate measures fairly well provided. But the methods used to this end were those of a totalitarian state, which was the owner of nuclear materials; and inside the state, such materials had practically no commercial value. The state set up a regime of secrecy and discipline, with all instructions strictly followed and failure to do so seriously punished.

The situation changed drastically after the USSR collapsed and reforms were launched in the country.

Firstly, the Soviet nuclear economy ceased to be an integral entity. The smoothly running system of interfacing and cooperation between Minsredmash (the predecessor of Minatom) enterprises was largely destroyed.

Secondly, the commercial value of nuclear materials became obvious. Thirdly, the national borders became more easily penetrable, providing

greater possibilities for smuggling or uncontrolled import/export of nuclear materials. This gave rise to the problem of illicit NM circulation, casing the need for tighter control over export of nuclear materials and dual-purpose products, as well as improved customs procedures.

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Finally, the very approach to NM security was lop-sided. Nuclear centers were protected mostly against external intrusion. Today, nuclear materials need protection from both outsiders and insiders.

All the above circumstances called for serious revision of the attitude towards NM management, ie. towards its accounting, control and physical protection. This book will deal primarily with various aspects of these three components in management of nuclear material.

Distribution of the nuclear industry potential in the USSR

In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in breakup of its formerly huge nuclear economy (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1

Nuclear industry potential at the time of the USSR collapse

The Soviet Union had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. When it ceased to exist, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were left with nuclear weapons in their possession. The question was whether this amounted to appearance of new nuclear-weapons states.

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In this situation, the whole world community and, first of all, Russia made enormous efforts to prevent nuclear weapons from sprawling into several countries and jeopardizing the regime of non-proliferation.

Russia removed all nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Today, all nuclear arms of the former USSR are kept within Russian borders.

As a result, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and all other ex-Soviet republics joined the NPT. The situation was rectified, and Russia succeeded to the Soviet Union as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Ship-borne nuclear power systems – carried first of all by submarines as well as by other vessels with nuclear reactors – are all found in Russia (the latter, e.g., belonging to the Murmansk Shipping Company).

As regards nuclear power plants, in 1991, Russia was left with 29 power units whose total capacity was 21.2 GW(e). Ukraine had 14 power units totaling 12.9 GW, while Kazakhstan owned one nuclear power plant with a 350 MW(e) fast neutron reactor BN–350. Part of the energy generated by the BN was used for desalination of seawater. BN–350 was shut down and is awaiting dismantling.

In Transcaucasia, only Armenia has a nuclear power plant consisting of two VVER–440 reactors. In 1989, the plant was close d down in reaction to popular anti-nuclear sentiments as well as for reasons of safety, considering that the plant was sited in a region of high seismic activity. Later, however, after the alarming energy crisis of 1992–1995, it w as decided to restart the reactors. The government of Armenia appealed to Russian Minatom for restoration of the NPP, as some of its equipment had gone into a bad state of repair over the time of its disuse. One power unit was successfully restarted and by 1999, the NPP was supplying 36 % of all electricity generated in this country.

In Lithuania, Minatom built the Ignalina NPP with its two RBMK-1500 power units. Both units are shut down today.

Uranium mining may be pointed out among the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC) stages listed in Table 1.1. It is only 40 % of all uranium mines that are found in Russia, Ukraine accounting for 20 %, Kazakhstan for 10 %, and Tajikistan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan for 30 %.

It is an important fact that the most hazardous – f rom the viewpoint of proliferation resistance – NFC capabilities are all sited in Russia. These are uranium enrichment, reprocessing and plutonium separation facilities.

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References

1.Ядерное нераспространение / Под общ. ред. В.А. Орлова. М.: ПИР Центр, 2002.

2.Гарднер Г.Т. Ядерное нераспространение. М.: МИФИ, 1995.

3.Тимербаев Р.М. Россия и ядерное нераспространение. М.: Наука,

1999.

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CHAPTER 2

MAIN TECHNOLOGIES OF THE PRESENT-DAY NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME*

Nuclear material (NM) is essential for two self-sustaining nuclear reactions which are accompanied by liberation of large energy amounts, namely:

∙chain fission reaction involving heavy nuclei. The nuclear material in this reaction includes natural isotopes of uranium and thorium, man-made

transuranic isotopes – mainly those of plutonium, a s well as of neptunium, americium, curium, berkelium, and californium, and the man-made 233U, which can be produced by exposure of thorium to neutron radiation;

∙thermonuclear fusion reaction involving nuclei of light isotopes. The nuclear material here includes hydrogen isotopes (deuterium and tritium). Natural hydrogen comprises 0.015 % of deuterium and none of tritium. Other nuclear materials are heavy water (D2O) and lithium whose

isotope 6Li is capable of vigorously producing tritium in the reaction 6Li(n,α)T.

Thus, nuclear materials are:

∙feed materials – uranium and thorium ores, natural uranium and thorium, depleted uranium (with low content of 235U);

∙special materials – enriched uranium (with high con tent of 235U), plutonium, and 233U;

∙transuranic elements – Np, Am, Cm, Bk, Cf;

∙heavy water, deuterium, tritium, lithium. Nuclear technologies include:

∙NM production;

∙NM storage, transportation and use;

∙NM reprocessing and recycling;

∙radioactive waste treatment and disposal.

Nuclear technologies and safe NM management are interrelated. The term “safety” – taken broadly – implies radiation s afety, nuclear safety, etc. In terms of non-proliferation, it means security from NM theft or diversion for production of nuclear explosives or other illicit uses.

* This chapter was prepared with the help of V.A. Apse and A.N. Shmelyov, based on the book by V.A. Apse and A.N. Shmelyov “Nuclear Technologies”. M.: MIFI, 2001.

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