Материал: Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

CHAPTER 2

REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PHYSICAL

PROTECTION

Physical protection is a complex and critical task, which requires a regulatory and legal framework to be formed for this to guide activities in the field.

NM physical protection activities are governed by respective Russian laws and regulatory documents. Requirements and recommendations in a number of international documents should be also taken into account. We shall start from these.

There is an IAEA-developed document [1] which forms a conceptual physical protection basis for different countries possessing nuclear material and nuclear facilities. This views physical protection in each particular country as a national problem to be addressed given the country’s specific features (geopolitical environment, peculiarities of nuclear installations, crime rate in the given country and so on).

The second international document is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1989). Also taking physical protection as a national-level issue, this document places emphasis on international NM transport.

The atomic energy law is the underlying Russian law [2]. Some of the chapters and sections therein do deal with physical protection issues, still, as is clear, in the most general terms.

More detailed regulation of physical protection is provided in another federal document [3]. This defines the functions of executive power bodies and sets forth major requirements for physical protection of nuclear sites, as well as for nuclear material and facilities during transport.

Law, clearly, simply outlines different aspects of physical protection activities and provides only general guidance on how this to be ensured. Therefore, a vital task is to generate industry (interindustry) regulations to take into account the specific features of nuclear installations and the need for carrying out interbranch activities.

The above instruments govern necessary procedures and impose requirements upon the PPS, its components and types of activities. A number of documents at this level describe the techniques of carrying out some activities (e.g. site vulnerability analysis, PPS performance assessment, PPS testing and others). One example to consider is Rosatom’s system of the PPS industry documents as discussed in [4, 5].

436

An essential part of the PPS regulatory framework is site-level regulations (bylaws, instructions and so on). These contain more detailed requirements to PP with regard for the specific features of this very NI. Such documents are developed and employed directly at the level of installations.

References

1.INFCIRC/225/rev. 4 «Методические рекомендации по физической защите ядерного материала».

2.Закон Российской Федерации об использовании атомной энергии. Принят 21 октября 1995 г.

3.Правила физической защиты ядерных материалов, ядерных установок и пунктов хранения ядерных материалов. Утверждены Постановлением Правительства РФ от 7 марта 1997 г. № 264.

4.Системы физической защиты ЯМ и У. Инструкция по организации проектирования. Минатом РФ. РД 95 10544–99.

5.Системы физической защиты ЯОО. Общие требования. Минатом РФ, 2001.

437

CHAPTER 3

STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE PHYSICAL

PROTECTION SYSTEM (PPS)

Nuclear material and nuclear facilities are contained in respective buildings and rooms within the protected area confined by a perimeter. Figure 3.1 shows a standard layout of a physically protected site.

Fig. 3.1. Standard layout of a physically protected site

A note should be made that only some of the buildings that accommodate NM and critical NF components require physical protection, while the presence of others affects physical protection tasks only indirectly (limited visibility, onsite movement routes and so on). This will be given

438

more detailed consideration in Chapter 5 where principles of the PPS zonal arrangement will be discussed.

Onsite forces and features are responsible for the physical protection at the level of nuclear installations. These are chiefly a response force as well as engineered physical protection features (EPPF).

Collectively, physical protection forces and features form a physical protection system (PPS), which represents an interlinked set of organizational, administrative and legal provisions, physical protection personnel and engineered features intended to ensure the physical protection of a particular nuclear site.

The PPS is a complex man-machine system an analysis whereof requires such techniques as systems engineering and operations research [1].

An analysis of such systems requires these to be first decomposed (subdivided) into subsystems. This makes it easier to get an insight into the hierarchical structure of the system as the whole and its individual components.

We shall decompose a PPS into respective subsystems. When doing this, one should keep in mind that a lower-level system is a subsystem of a higher-level system. Thus, in turn, the PPS is a subsystem of the whole NI safety and security system, which also includes other systems (nuclear safety, fire safety, NM accounting and control, etc.).

The PPS structure is shown in Fig. 3.2.

PhysicalСистема физическойprotectionзащитыsystem

Fig. 3.2. Structure of a physical protection system

As can be seen in Fig. 3.2, the PPS has three key components, the functions whereof will be discussed hereinafter.

439

The prime objective of engineered physical protection features is to acquire information on unauthorized activities to be further used to produce respective control responses.

Physical barriers have the purpose of making it more difficult for attackers to carry out the actions planned.

Administrative provisions establish the onsite PP procedures (rules). The guard force response to suppress the above attacker actions is a sort of an “actuator” for the PPS and makes it possible to reach the final objective of the NI protection.

A note should be made that the PPS subsystems at all levels should be balanced and contribute to the overall goal of the NI protection against unauthorized activities of potential attackers.

Separate subsystems and their respective functions are described hereinafter.

References

1. Подиновский В.В. Оптимизация систем по последовательно применяемым критериям. М.: Радио и связь, 1985.

440