Материал: Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

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The term “special communication” is used chiefly be cause of the need to protect information in the communication system.

Supporting systems

The term “supporting systems” gives a good notion o f what these systems are.

One illustrative example is the power supply system which is essential for operations of all the systems discussed above.

Another example is the lighting system which supports operations of the video surveillance system components (TV cameras).

More examples of supporting facilities and systems are the system of cable ducts that connect individual components in the above key systems, and structural elements (zone cabinets, etc.).

4.2. Physical barriers and organizational subsystem of the PPS

Physical barriers

Physical barriers (PB) have an important role in the PPS. A physical barrier is a physical obstacle that ensures the intruder delay to slow down the attacker’s movement to the target within the protected area.

In fact, it is not enough to receive an unauthorized action signal from a detection sensor or a component of the ACS. Another condition needs to be fulfilled to make so that the attacker action time (Тa) be longer than the response force action time (Тrf). It is important that the response force has a slack margin, that is, that the condition Тa > Тrf or Тrf = Тa – Тrf > 0 is fulfilled, where Тrf is the response force slack time.

Physical barriers have the purpose of delaying the attacker in every way possible and increasing Тa.

Physical barriers may be fixed and controlled.

Specifically, the following classes of physical barriers may be identified:

∙existing onsite physical barriers:

structural elements of buildings (walls, ceilings, doors); elements of the terrain and vegetation;

∙ artificial physical barriers: perimeter and local area fencing;

locks, meshes and reinforced doors in buildings and rooms; anti-ram facilities at vehicle access control points;

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special physical barriers (sound-and-light, smoke-discharge, foaming, etc.).

There are also techniques of influencing the intruder (electric shock, gas discharge and others), though onsite uses of these are subject to authorization by respective law.

Response force

The response force (RF) is responsible for the ultimate suppression of the intruder actions. This means that the RF starts to act as information is received from facilities or the guard on duty about an attempted intrusion into the site or into some of its protected areas. The choice of the response tactics depends so on respective regulatory requirements and on the situation at hand.

The RF comprises several units, each of which is assigned to the task of its own. Thus, the alarm unit moves to the DS response point, the reinforcement unit heads for the site’s most vulnerable points to tighten security thereof and so on.

As will be shown below, time relations depend on the tactics chosen. Thus, we reduce Тrf by redeploying the RF and getting it closer the potential action points.

Organizational arrangements

Lastly, it is very important that all PPS components act coherently. We shall dwell on how to build and operate the PPS below, when consideration will be given to design and optimization of physical protection systems. Now just a note should be made that the order should be kept within the installation in the course of the PPS operation as established earlier through organizational arrangements. These arrangements include:

∙NI personnel actions in standard and emergency situations;

∙interactions among the onsite PP-related services and of these with the “outside world” (municipal authorities, superior or ganizations and security agencies);

∙maintenance of engineered physical protection features.

The arrangements taken should be governed by regulations (bylaws, instructions, etc.). This makes the PPS operations less dependent on subjective factors. For example, where no regulatory documents exist, the decision in some situations will be made by an executive officer at the respective level, that is, the decisions taken will be much determined by his/her personal qualities. A hard and adamant security service leader will

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create a great deal of problems to the normal site operations, while, in contrast, an excessively mild leader will cause poorer control of the NI, which will ultimately make it less physically protected.

A note should be made that modern physical protection systems have an increasingly great number of organizational functions vested nowadays in their hardware. Thus, modern AC systems rely on a “ two-person rule” based on a collective responsibility principle (including with respect to the opening of rooms and the activation of security modes for these) when a person watches the actions of another person to reduce the probability of unauthorized activities.

Here is one more example. A timer is built in the data acquisition and processing system, which is triggered the moment the alarm unit (AU) responds to an alarm. When reaching the destination, the AU should report so to make it possible to know the exact guard personnel movement times and, accordingly, the final time of Тrf.

References

1.Глебов В.Б., Измайлов А.В., Румянцев А.Н. Введение в системы учета, контроля и физической защиты ядерных материалов. М.:

МИФИ, 2001.

2.Измайлов А.В. Методы проектирования и анализа эффективности систем физической защиты ядерных материалов и установок. М.: МИФИ, 2002.

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CHAPTER 5

GENERAL CONCEPTS OF THE PPS DESIGN

The creation of complex systems is based on general concepts representative of systems of any nature, as well as on a number of specific principles that reflect the features of the given class of systems. The PPS features, as discussed hereinabove, define the set of specific concepts which are set forth below [1].

Zoning – defense in depth. This concept suggests the esta blishment of a system of guarded onsite areas enclosed one into another: a protected area, an inner area and a vital area (Fig. 5.1).

The protected area (PA) means the whole of the NI territory surrounded by physical barriers subject to continuous guarding and surveillance with access thereto being restricted and controlled. The inner area is inside the protected area (there may be more than one inner area). The inner area respectively includes the vital area (there may be also several vital areas). Safeguard measures become tougher from the outside to the physically protected items (PPI).

Here are some examples of such areas. If, as mentioned above, the protected area is the entire installation territory, the inner area (IA) may consist of buildings or separate parts of buildings within this territory, while rooms (clusters of rooms) inside buildings may be viewed as the vital area (VA).

The boundaries of the areas are equipped with engineered features with dedicated passages (drives) arranged therein for the authorized personnel access to the site. Clearly, requirements differ for the equipment of the areas and the boundaries thereof with engineered features and organizationally. Depending on the category of the physically protected item, this should be held within a particular area. For example, regulations require HEU to be held within the IA or the VA.

Of note is that areas may include additional EPPF-equipped barriers that are not on the area boundary and do not change the area status.

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Защищённая зона

 

 

 

Protected area

 

 

 

 

 

Внутренняя зона

 

 

 

 

Inner area

 

 

 

 

Особо важная зона

 

 

 

 

Vital area

 

 

 

a)

 

 

Защищённая зона

 

 

 

 

Protected area

 

 

 

 

 

Нарушитель

 

 

 

 

Intruder

 

 

 

 

Engineered physical

 

 

 

 

Инженерно-технические

 

 

 

 

средства физической

 

 

 

 

protection features

 

 

b)

 

защиты

 

 

 

Сигнал тревоги

 

 

 

 

Alarm

 

Защищённая зона

 

 

 

Protected area

 

 

250

 

 

 

Administrative

 

20

 

 

 

 

 

Административное

ÊÏ Ï

200

30

 

здание

250

ÊÏ Ï

 

 

building

 

 

 

Контрольно-пропускной

 

 

 

 

 

250

100

ÊÏ Ï Access control point

175

 

 

 

пункт

 

 

 

Personnel flow

25

200

 

 

 

30

Поток персонала

 

 

 

ÊÏ Ï

ÊÏ Ï

 

 

200

 

 

 

NI personnel

c)

Персонал ЯО

 

Fig. 5.1. PPS zoning principle: a) – guarded areas;

b) – defense-in-depth barriers; c) – differentiated personnel access to guarded areas

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Источник: https://studfile.net/preview/16708779/