Материал: Апсе ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 2014

CHAPTER 3. PROBLEMS OF FISSILE MATERIALS NONPROLIFERATION AT VARIOUS STAGES OF THE CLOSED NFC

Nuclear technologies deal with fissile nuclear materials which could be used as a charge of a nuclear explosive device. Therefore, one of the main tasks in development and routine application of nuclear technologies is a strict NM control at all NFC stages in order to prevent NM usage in any illegal actions.

The following three ways towards NM diversion from a peaceful civilian (mainly, energy) use to any illegal (mainly, military of terrorist) applications are estimated as possible ones:

1.Forcible theft of nuclear materials resulted from a terrorist attack on

anuclear object or a transportation tool.

Prevention of the forcible NM theft is a major mission of NM physical protection system (PPS).

Main PPS components:

a.System of physical barriers (fences) to prevent any intrusion of potential proliferators (or terrorists) onto the territory of a nuclear object or into the premises where NM can be placed.

b.Systems of exterior and interior sensors to detect any intrusion of potential proliferators through the outer perimeter of a nuclear object and through the inner barriers towards NM storage and utilization points.

c.System of TV-surveillance for the area adjacent to the outer perimeter and for the inner premises where NM can be stored or utilized.

d.System of special means to delay movement of potential proliferators through the territory of a nuclear object.

e.System of the armed guard forces for detection, interception and detention of potential proliferators.

2.Covert theft of nuclear materials by staff members (internal adversaries) of a nuclear object (maybe, by gradual theft of very small, undetectable NM quantities for a long time).

Prevention of the covert NM theft is a major mission of NM control and accountability (MC&A) system.

Main components of MC&A system:

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a.Video-surveillance of NM stored in a form of accountable items (containers).

b.Administrative measures on access control to NM storage and utilization points.

c.Division of a nuclear object into a series of NM balance areas (MBA) equipped with sensors capable to detect NM movements between different MBA.

d.Computerized NM accounting system equipped with remote terminals in key MBA points which can transmit NM-related information to

acentral computer with application of the information security software tools.

e.Periodical NM physical inventory taking for NM in a form of accountable items and for NM in a bulk-form with application of temperindicating devices (TID).

f.Selective examination of NM containers and NM in a bulk-form with application of destructive and non-destructive experimental methodologies.

3.Covert NM switching over to an illegal military purpose sanctioned by national government.

Prevention of the covert NM switching over to any military aims sanctioned by national government is a major mission of the international treaties intended to control peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The following main international treaties on peaceful use of nuclear energy were concluded and signed:

a.The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, was signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. On May 11, 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.

b.The EURATOM Treaty, i.e. the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, was signed in Rome, on March 25, 1957.

c.Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded in November 1975 as a response to the Indian nuclear test. The NSG is a multi-national body concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapons development.

d.The Treaty of Tlatelolco, i.e. the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, was signed on February 14,

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1967, in Mexico City. Under the Treaty, the states-parties agreed to prohibit and prevent the “testing, use, manufacture , production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons” and the “receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons”.

e.The Treaty of Rarotonga, i.e. the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, was signed on August 6, 1985, on the Rarotonga Island (Cook Islands). The Treaty bans the use, testing and possession of nuclear weapons within the borders of the zone.

f.The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty by which the states-parties agreed to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments for military or civilian purposes. The Treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996.

The main State-level mechanism of nuclear non-proliferation control is based on regular inspections performed by the IAEA experts who examine independently the really available NM quantities at nuclear objects under the IAEA jurisdiction.

3.1. Factors of NM attractiveness at various NFC stages

Applicability of nuclear materials to their use in nuclear explosive devices can be characterized by the following factors of NM attractiveness:

1. Quantity and quality of nuclear materials needed to produce a nuclear explosive device.

Minimal mass of fissile NM in which the chain fission reaction can

take place is a critical mass. For example, critical masses of 235U, 239Pu and 233U are equal approximately to 50 kg, 15 kg and 17 kg, respec-

tively. These values were obtained for metallic spheres without neutron reflector. Effective neutron reflector can reduce the critical mass nearly twice.

The IAEA introduced a special unit for measuring NM mass, namely “Significant Quantity” (SQ). Detection of NM disbal ance exceeding 1 SQ is a reason for the IAEA inspectors to initiate a special investigation and, if necessary, appeal to the UN Security Council for application of appropriate sanctions. The Significant Quantity is nearly half the critical mass of fissile materials in the form of non-reflected metallic sphere.

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1 SQ (239Pu, 233U) = 8 kg; 1 SQ (235U) = 25 kg.

The critical masses of uranium and plutonium dioxides are larger than those for metal uranium and plutonium by a factor about 1,5.

2.NM accessibility, simplicity of NM theft, detectability of NM

theft.

3.Simplicity of NM conversion into charge of a nuclear explosive device. Is it sufficient to use mechanical or chemical treatment only? Is it necessary to apply some sophisticated technologies of isotope separation?

These factors define the following values:

1.Duration of the time interval needed to manufacture a nuclear explosive device by the adversaries or to undertake proper countermeasures by the security forces.

2.Scale of material, industrial and financial resources needed to manufacture a nuclear explosive device.

All the factors should be taken into account to estimate various NFC stages from the standpoint of nuclear non-proliferation, i.e. NM attractiveness for theft and further manufacturing of nuclear explosive devices. It is a difficult task to give an exact quantitative estimation of the NFC stages on their attractiveness for potential nuclear proliferators but some qualitative estimates were made by the US experts (Fig. 3.1).

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Fig. 3.1. Attractiveness of the NFC stages on the reasonability of NM theft

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